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I am pleased to present the inaugural issue of the National Counterintelligence Center's (NACIC) Counterintelligence News and Developments (CIND). This periodic publication is designed to meet the information needs of US private industry by communicating important, yet unclassified information on the threat posed by foreign countries against US interests.
The CIND is part of the NACIC's effort to develop a more effective mechanism to disseminate information on foreign intelligence targeting activities against both the US Government and private industry. This initial issue includes some information you may have already seen in our Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage and the Survey of the Counterintelligence Needs of Private Industry. From time to time, we will republish or extract information from such key publications to highlight data we perceive to be of interest to private industry. Furthermore, we will solicit additional information from all sources in order to better understand and support private industry through this unclassified forum.
The NACIC will not generally republish information readily available to the general public. Our goal is to make the CIND's contents substantive and relevant to customer needs. Therefore, I cannot overemphasize the importance of receiving feedback from each of you. Future issues will respond to the requirements of industry as a whole and will be driven by your needs and interests. The responses received from you, the customer, will determine the future content, format, and frequency of the CIND. The final page of the current edition provides information on how to forward responses to the CIND Editor.
Michael J. Waguespack
Director,
National Counterintelligence Center
What Is the NACIC?
The National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) was established in 1994 by Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-24. The NACIC's creation was one of the recommendations made by PDD-24 to improve US counterintelligence (CI) effectiveness by enhancing coordination and cooperation among various US CI agencies.
An interagency organization staffed with CI and security professionals from the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the Departments of Defense and State, the NACIC is primarily responsible for coordinating national-level CI activities, and reports to the National Security Council through the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB). The NACIC also:
- The NACIC's Awareness Working Group, which consists of representatives from 17 Federal agencies.
- The NACIC's Industry Council, which consists of 20 senior security officials or other senior officials of major US corporations.
- Sponsorship of CI training and awareness programs, seminars, and conferences.
The NACIC cooperates with other US Government agencies by identifying and broadly disseminating information on the human and technical collection methods used by foreign powers against the United States, including threats encountered by US businessmen at home or overseas.
US industry responses to the CIND will further refine the support the NACIC provides in an unclassified format. See the final section of this CIND to find out how to report your views.
The Counterintelligence Needs of Private Industry
The NACIC and the Department of State's Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) conducted a Survey of the Counterintelligence Needs of Private Industry during the first half of 1995. Of the 1,400 surveys mailed to corporate security managers of OSAC affiliate members, 173 (12.4 percent) were returned.
In part, the survey concluded that:
Since the survey was published in June 1995, the FBI has progressed in revamping its Development of Espionage, Counterintelligence, and Counterterrorism Awareness (DECA) Notes-an FBI publication that identifies foreign intelligence targeting of US interests. In the near future, unclassified foreign intelligence threat information will be available from DECA Coordinators via FAX. There are also plans to make DECA information available on the Internet.
Reprinted below is an extract from the survey discussing process issues, targeting, and interactive communication. The information from the survey-together with follow-on dialogue with major corporate representatives to NACIC's Industry Council, OSAC, and representatives of various professional associations focused on the issue-supports the most current and accurate data the NACIC has that addresses the CI needs of private industry.
Process Issues
The survey revealed that a third of the respondents had no contact whatsoever with US intelligence representatives. This may be an indication that the interaction between the private sector and the Intelligence Community (IC) for obtaining and reporting CI information needs to be strengthened. Although there are many US Government agencies that provide threat information to private industry, more emphasis needs to be placed on Federal outreach programs that require active agency support to ensure their credibility and viability within private industry.
There are several outreach programs already in existence: the FBI runs the DECA program; the Defense Investigative Service's (DIS) CI office has a program for the DOD contractor community; the Department of Energy has its Defensive Information to Counter Espionage Program; and the State Department coordinates the OSAC program with its member affiliates. Each program reaches out to US corporations, giving and receiving threat information. These processes, already in place and affirmed by the majority of survey respondents, need to be invigorated and expanded to spread CI information into more of the private sector with communication bridges back to the IC.
One example of a new initiative that is taking place is the NACIC's team effort with OSAC. OSAC already has a process for providing notices of crime and terrorism directed at US companies operating overseas through their electronic bulletin board. The NACIC intends to work with OSAC to expand the use of its bulletin board to include CI reporting.
Targeting
In 1994, 74 US companies reported a total of 446 incidents where suspected targeting by foreign governments had taken place against their companies either domestically or overseas. In the overwhelming majority of these incidents, the primary object of foreign intelligence targeting was corporate proprietary information. However, while these 74 corporations reported the suspected targeting of their companies in 1994, only 16 percent felt that those losses were through foreign government theft attempts, suggesting the remainder stemmed from industrial theft or other illicit activities. Interestingly, 45 out of 95 corporations with technologies on the National Critical Technologies List reported 237 of the total number of suspected incidents. This statistic indicates that slightly more than half the targeting was against US critical information.
In all cases, the corporations that reported suspected targeting also expended resources toward safeguarding their proprietary information, employees, facilities, and telecommunication systems. These corporations responded to the threat-and steps were taken to protect their business assets.
However, only 58 percent of the 74 companies reported the incidents to the US Government. This lack of reporting hinders the government's capability to aggregate and analyze such data to provide accurate CI information back to US industry. Absent such analysis revealing priority targets or detectable trends, ad hoc and piecemeal information may be of limited use in the corporate decisionmaking process. Hence, communication between private industry and the IC needs to be more open in both directions.
Interactive Communication
Are security managers willing to provide incident information for use by other corporations? Corporations with classified contracts indicated more of a willingness to share incident information (91 percent) than corporations without classified contracts (75 percent).
However, when it came to revealing a dollar value associated with the loss, only 66 percent of corporations with classified contracts and 47 percent of corporations without classified contracts indicated that they would be willing to share that information. Financial corporations were more willing than any other industry group to give both incident information and dollar-value losses. This response is not surprising since private industry has other factors-a board of directors, stockholders, the stock market-that makes them hesitant to reveal profit margin information. Nonetheless, such monetary impact data can represent the ``smoking gun'' so essential to selling the value of CI awareness training and threat briefing programs.
Once information on foreign modus operandi is collected, up-to-date analytical reports can be produced and distributed so that all industries can benefit. As identified, the FBI has a DECA Coordinator in each of its field offices to provide general or specific threat information in meetings or briefings with corporate security managers or senior executives. DIS and other DOD military components also actively support the defense contractor community with threat analyses and briefings. OSAC has a number of Country Councils overseas and has created a Committee for the Protection of Information and Technology to exchange economic threat information.
As for publications, the DECA program periodically publishes foreign intelligence threat information in DECA Notes. The NACIC is producing this national Counterintelligence News and Developments publication as another method for getting information to the private sector. Although these are not quarterly reports as requested by survey respondents, such products are focused in the right direction and should be used as the framework for a positive exchange of threat information. The NACIC has also begun a project to catalogue current CI products for private industry use. These individual programs and publications all strive to support private industry, but a more coordinated effort to share information must be developed for the future.
Industrial Espionage Collection Methods
The following collection methods were extracted from NACIC's Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Intelligence Collection and Industrial Espionage, which was published in July 1995.
A number of foreign countries pose various levels and types of threats to US economic and technological information. Some have been considered ideological and military adversaries for decades. Their targeting of US economic and technological information is not new but has continued as an extension of the concerted intelligence assault on the United States that was conducted throughout the Cold War. Others are either longtime allies of the United States that was or have traditionally been neutral. These countries target US economic and technological information despite their friendly relations with the United States. In some cases, they take advantage of their considerable legitimate access to US information and collect sensitive information more easily than our military adversaries. In addition, some of the countries traditionally considered allies have infrastructures that allow them to easily internalize high-tech information and utilize it in competition against US firms.
Practitioners seldom use one method in isolation but combine them into concerted collection programs. Although countries or corporations have been known to turn legitimate transactions or business relationships into clandestine collection opportunities, some of the methods listed are most often used for legitimate purposes. While their inclusion here is not intended to imply illegal activity, they are listed as potential elements of a broader, coordinated intelligence effort.
Traditional Methods
Traditional espionage methods primarily reserved for collecting national defense information are now being applied to collect economic and proprietary information. Traditional awareness training is most suitable for countering these collection methods.
Classic Agent Recruitment. An intelligence collector's best source is a trusted person inside a company or organization whom the collector can task to provide proprietary or classified information. A foreign collector's interest in employees is not necessarily commensurate with their rank in the company. Researchers, key business managers, and corporate executives can all be targets, but so can support employees such as secretaries, computer operators, technicians, and maintenance people. The latter frequently have good, if not the best, access to competitive information. In addition, their lower pay and rank may provide fertile ground for manipulation by an intelligence agency.
US Volunteers. The individuals most likely to improperly acquire a company's information are the company's own employees. Employees who resort to stealing information exhibit the same motivations and human frailties as the average thief or spy: illegal or excessive use of drugs or alcohol, money problems, personal stress, and just plain greed.
Surveillance and Surreptitious Entry. Economic and industrial espionage may involve simply breaking into an office containing desired information. Companies have reported break-ins in which laptop computers or disks were stolen, even when there were easily obtainable, more valuable items in the same vicinity. These instances are not always reported, or reported as merely break-ins, without considering the possibility that the target was information rather than equipment.
Some countries persuade hotel operators to provide intelligence collectors with access to visitors' luggage or rooms. During these surreptitious break-ins, known colloquially as ``bag ops,'' unattended luggage is searched for sensitive information, and any useful documents are copied or simply stolen.
Specialized Technical Operations. This activity includes computer intrusions, telecommunications targeting and intercept, and private-sector encryption weaknesses, and account for the largest portion of economic and industrial information lost by US corporations.
Because they are so easily accessed and intercepted, corporate telecommunications-particularly international telecommunications-provide a highly vulnerable and lucrative source for anyone interested in obtaining trade secrets or competitive information. Because of the increased usage of these links for bulk computer data transmission and electronic mail, intelligence collectors find telecommunications intercepts cost-effective. For example, foreign intelligence collectors intercept facsimile transmissions through government-owned telephone companies, and the stakes are large-approximately half of all overseas telecommunications are facsimile transmissions. Innovative ``hackers'' connected to computers containing competitive information evade the controls and access companies' information. In addition, many American companies have begun using electronic data interchange, a system of transferring corporate bidding, invoice, and pricing data electronically overseas. Many foreign government and corporate intelligence collectors find this information invaluable.
Economic Disinformation. Some governments also use disinformation campaigns to scare their domestic companies and potential clients away from dealing with US companies. Press and government agencies frequently discuss foreign economic and industrial intelligence activities, often in vague, nonspecific terms. The issue has been used to paint foreign competitors or countries as aggressive and untrustworthy, even if the accuser has no tangible evidence of any collection activity. Some countries have widely publicized their efforts to set up information security mechanisms to protect against their competitors' penetration attempts, and frequently the United States is mentioned as the primary threat.
Other Economic Collection Methods
Tasking Foreign Students Studying in the United States. Some foreign governments task foreign students specifically to acquire information on a variety of economic and technical subjects. In some instances, countries recruit students before they come to the United States to study and task them to send any technological information they acquire back to their home country. Others are approached after arriving and are recruited or pressured based upon a sense of loyalty or fear for their home country's government or intelligence service.
In some instances, at an intelligence collector's behest, foreign graduate students serve as assistants at no cost to professors doing research in a targeted field. The student then has access to the professor's research and learns the applications of the technology.
As an alternative to compulsory military service, one foreign government has an organized program to send interns abroad, often with the specific task of collecting foreign business and technological information.
Tasking Foreign Employees of US Firms and Agencies. Foreign companies and governments sometimes recruit or task compatriot employees within a US firm to steal proprietary information. Although similar to clandestine recruitment used traditionally by intelligence services, often no intelligence service is involved, only a competing company or non-intelligence government agency. The collector then passes the information directly to a foreign firm or the government for use in its R&D activities.
Debriefing of Foreign Visitors to the United States. Some countries actively debrief their citizens after foreign travel, asking for any information acquired during their trips abroad. Sometimes these debriefing sessions are heavy-handed, with some foreign scientists describing them as offensive. In other countries, they are simply an accepted part of traveling abroad.
Recruitment of Emigres, Ethnic Targeting. Frequently, intelligence collectors find it effective to target persons of their own ethnic group. They particularly seek individuals working in US military and R&D facilities who have access to proprietary and classified US technology. Several countries have found repatriation of emigre and foreign ethnic scientists to be the most beneficial technology transfer methodology. One country, in particular, claims to have repatriated thousands of ethnic scientists back to their home country from the United States. Ethnic targeting includes attempts to recruit and task naturalized US citizens and permanent resident aliens to assist in acquiring US S&T information. Frequently, foreign intelligence collectors appeal to a person's patriotism and ethnic loyalty. Some countries' collectors resort to threatening family members that continue to reside in their home country.
Elicitation During International Conferences and Trade Fairs. Events-such as international conferences on high-tech topics, trade fairs, and air shows-attract many foreign scientists and engineers, providing foreign intelligence collectors with a concentrated group of specialists on a certain topic. Collectors target these individuals while they are abroad to gather any information the scientists or engineers may possess. Sometimes, depending on the foreign country and the specific circumstances, these elicitation efforts are heavy-handed and threatening, while other times they are subtle.
Foreign intelligence collectors sometimes attempt to recruit scientists by inviting them on expense-paid trips abroad for conferences or sabbaticals. The individuals are treated royally, and their advice is sought on areas of interest. When they return to the United States, collectors recontact them and ask them to provide information on their areas of research.
Commercial Data Bases, Trade and Scientific Journals, Computer Bulletin Boards, Openly Available US Government Data, Corporate Publications. Many collectors take advantage of the vast amount of competitive information that is legally and openly available in the United States. Open-source information can provide personality profile data, data on new R&D and planned products, new manufacturing techniques, and competitors' strengths and weaknesses. Most collectors use this information for its own worth in their business competition. However, some use openly available information as leads to refine and focus their clandestine collection and to identify individuals and organizations that possess desired information.
Clandestine Collection of Open-Source Materials. Because they believe that they are closely monitored by US CI, some traditional intelligence services resort to clandestine methods to collect even open-source materials. They have been known to use false names when accessing open-source data bases and at times ask that a legal and open relationship be kept confidential.
Foreign Government Use of Private-Sector Organizations, Front Companies, and Joint Ventures. Some foreign governments exploit existing non-government affiliated organizations or create new ones-such as friendship societies, international exchange organizations, import-export companies, and other entities that have frequent contact with foreigners-to gather intelligence and to station intelligence collectors. They conceal government involvement in these organizations and present them as purely private entities in order to cover their intelligence operations. These organizations spot and assess potential foreign intelligence recruits with whom they have contact. Such organizations also lobby US Government officials to change policies the foreign government considers unfavorable.
Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions. Several countries use corporate mergers and acquisitions to acquire technology. The vast majority of these transactions are made for completely legitimate purposes. However, sometimes they are made specifically to allow a foreign company to acquire US-origin technologies without spending their own resources on R&D.
According to a 1994 US Government document, entitled Report on US Critical Technology Companies, 984 foreign mergers and acquisitions of US critical technology companies occurred between 1 January 1985 and 1 October 1993. All but a handful of these mergers and acquisitions were friendly, and four countries accounted for 68 percent of them. Of the total, 60 percent involved US firms in advanced materials, computers-including software and peripherals-and biotechnology, areas of relative US technical strength. The remaining deals involved US firms in electronics and semiconductors, professional and scientific instrumentation, communications equipment, advanced manufacturing, and aircraft and spare parts.
Headhunting, Hiring Competitors' Employees. Foreign companies typically hire knowledgeable employees of competing US firms to do corresponding work for the foreign firm. At times, they do this specifically to gain inside technical information from the employee and use it against the competing US firm.
Corporate Technology Agreements. Some foreign companies use potential technology sharing agreements as conduits for receiving proprietary information. In such instances, foreign companies demand that, in order to negotiate an agreement, the US company must divulge large amounts of information about its processes and products, sometimes much more than is justified by the project being negotiated. Often, the information requested is highly sensitive. In some of these cases, the foreign company either terminates the deal after receipt of the information or refuses to negotiate further if denied the information.
Sponsorship of Research Activities in the United States. Numerous foreign countries exploit a favorable research climate in the United States to sponsor research activities at US universities and research centers. Generally, both the United States and the foreign country benefit from the finished research. At times, however, foreign governments or companies use the opportunity as a one-sided attempt only to collect research results and proprietary information at the US facility. Foreign intelligence services also use these efforts as platforms to insert intelligence officers who act solely as information collectors.
Hiring Information Brokers, Consultants. Information brokers scour the world for valuable proprietary data. What they cannot obtain legally or by guile, some information brokers purchase. The broker then verifies the data, puts it into a usable and easily accessible format, and delivers it to interested clients. The following advertisement published in the Asian Wall Street Journal in 1991 illustrates this activity:
Do you have advanced/privileged information on any type of project/contract that is going to be carried out in your country? We hold commission/agency agreements with many large European companies and could introduce them to ``your'' project/contract. Any commission received would be shared with yourselves.
The ad was followed by a phone number in Western Europe.
Some countries frequently hire well-connected consultants to write reports on topics of interest and to lobby US Government officials on the country's behalf. Often, the consultants are former high-ranking US Government officials who maintain contacts with their former colleagues. They exploit these connections and contract relationships to acquire protected information and to gain access to other high-level officials who are currently holding positions of authority through whom they attempt to further acquire protected information.
Fulfillment of Classified US Government Contracts and Exploitation of DOD-Sponsored Technology Sharing Agreements. At times, classified US Government contracts are awarded to companies that are partially or substantially controlled by a foreign government. Although US Government security agencies closely monitor these contracts, they can still provide foreign governments unauthorized access to information. Traditional allies of the United States are most likely to use this method, since non-allies seldom are included in such contracts.
Tasking Liaison Officers at Government-to-Government Projects. During joint R&D activities, foreign governments routinely request to have an on-site liaison officer to monitor progress and provide guidance. Several allied countries have taken advantage of these positions as cover for intelligence officers assigned with collecting as much information about the facility as possible. Using their close access to their US counterparts conducting joint R&D, particularly in the defense arena, liaison officers have been caught removing documents that are clearly marked as restricted or classified.
Business Travel-Russia
During 1994, the Russian Government repeatedly complained that, in their eagerness to attract investment, Russian defense enterprises were providing classified information to US firms. These complaints stemmed in part from the Russian definition of what constitutes secret information. Travelers to Russia should be aware that basic information about the activities of a Russian defense enterprise-production levels, sources of raw materials, size of the labor force, salary levels-is still technically classed as ``state secrets'' under Russian law. In 1995, the Russian counterintelligence service obtained broad new powers and initiated an aggressive campaign to prevent the flow of state secrets to the West.
The traveler should be aware that the Russian successor agency to the KGB maintains representatives at enterprises that handle classified research. An April 1995 article in the Russian press reported that special units to protect state secrets, staffed by specially trained security officials, were being established in Russian enterprises and institutes. These units would be located in all establishments with access to state secrets, regardless of the form of ownership. Because of the broad interpretation of what constitutes a state secret in Russia, practically all enterprises could fall under this new security regime.
When dealing with the Russian defense establishment, the traveler should make every effort to obey Russian law regulating such contact. At present, this often means working through Rosvoorouzhenie-the Russian State Corporation for the Export and Import of Armament and Military Equipment. Rosvoorouzhenie was created in January 1994; one of its roles is to prevent the unauthorized export of sensitive defense technology from Russian defense enterprises. Rosvoorouzhenie representatives frequently participate in business discussions and contract negotiations with US firms, often dictating the terms of an agreement.
The traveler's own credentials may make him an attractive target for the Russian services. The services are likely to use the traveler's Russian contacts to collect information on him. The traveler should expect that the Russian businessmen, scientists, and interpreters he meets could be intelligence officers, as Russian intelligence services increasingly make use of commercial cover-in some cases to collect information in the high-technology and defense fields, and in other cases to scrutinize the American traveler for signs of a "secret" agenda. The services also place intelligence officers under cover in government organizations. Travelers should be prepared to be subject to overly probing questions about sensitive or proprietary research and development programs.
Likewise, the local employees of a US firm's office in Russia are particularly vulnerable to pressure from the Russian intelligence services. It is best to assume that all Russian employees of US companies, especially those doing business in high-technology or military-related fields, are reporting to the Russian intelligence services. Assume also that the intelligence services are monitoring all communications (FAXes, telephone, e-mail, and so forth) to and from a firm's Russian office.
Official travelers are not immune to targeting or harassment by the Russian security services. In early August 1995, the Russian counterintelligence service detained a US Army Captain West Point professor on a scientific research trip in Siberia. He had ventured into a forbidden nuclear zone carrying a device that could accurately pinpoint geographic locations. The trip had been approved and sponsored by the Russian Academy of Sciences, and he had been asked specifically by his Russian scientific colleagues to bring with him the global positioning system that was the subject of the complaint. This device is commercially available, and the traveler made no effort to conceal his activities. Apparently the victim of a provocation, he was detained and eventually expelled as persona-non-grata. Neither his US military affiliation nor the official sanction of the Russian institution that invited him afforded protection in this case.
Travelers should be aware that the Russian interpretation of what constitutes ``spying'' can be very broad and subject to change. There is no legal definition of ``espionage'' in Russia. Natural paranoia, and this lack of specific legal parameters allow the security services to define spying as it fits their needs. One Russian television broadcaster accused the US astronauts training for the Russian Mir space station of being spies and collecting information on Russian space capabilities.
Crime is on the rise in Russia, particularly crime against Westerners. Since most Russian hotels provide little protection against theft and harassment, travelers should plan to stay in one of the Western-owned or joint-venture hotels. The recent disappearances of a prominent US relief worker and an US freelance photographer in Chechnya strikingly demonstrate the risks of doing business in Russia, particularly in the strife-torn Caucasus.
Travelers who encounter any difficulties with the police or security service, or are the victims of a crime, should contact American Citizen Services (ACS), in the US Embassy in Moscow; the Embassy number is (095) 252-2451 through 252-2459. ACS, which is responsible for assisting ``distressed'' Americans, is open weekdays during regular business hours. In the event of an after-hours emergency, the traveler should telephone the US Embassy and ask to speak to the duty officer.
CI Incident Log
This section will report selected acts of industrial espionage/economic intelligence collection as reported to US Government organizations.
The NACIC solicits information on incidents reported by US companies. Most useful are incidents that reflect specific methods, circumstances, and named countries or organizations. The following representative incident was reported to the NACIC by a US company:
As requested by the US company, the identities of the companies and the country involved have been protected. Is this typical of the type of information we can expect? Are you willing to provide more detail, or is this enough? Can your company make useful security policy decisions based on this type of information? See the final section of this publication to respond to the CIND editor.
CI Capsules
Information Resources
This section of the CIND will list US Government and private industry publications and resources that have a counterintelligence (CI) applicability. At times, capsule reviews by the NACIC or commentary from other sources may be provided for a particular resource. The contents of these reviews or other commentary are not to be viewed as an official endorsement by the NACIC.
The Department of Defense Security Institute (DODSI) produces The Security Awareness Bulletin. It provides current information on security and CI developments, training methods, and educational courses and seminars. The bulletin is produced monthly. For additional information contact:
DOD Security Institute
ATTN: Del Carrell
Security Education and Awareness Team
8000 Jefferson Davis Hwy
Richmond, VA 23297-5091
tel: 804/279-5314
US Department of State Consular Information Sheets are produced and updated on a periodic basis by the US Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs. They provide current information on CI, terrorism, crime, and other issue-related topics for foreign countries. For additional information contact:
Bureau of Consular Affairs automated fax index at (202) 647-3000
Training and Education
The NACIC's Community Training Branch will host the following Regional Awareness Seminars through the Spring of 1996:
McLean, VA-12-13 March 1996
Chicago, IL-Spring 1996
Huntsville, AL or Atlanta, GA-Spring 1996
The seminars are designed in cooperation with a variety of industry associations to present industrial security decisionmakers with integrated community CI information and to point out local resources available to company CI Awareness programs.
For assistance and information concerning the seminars, contact the Community Training Branch at the NACIC: (703) 874-4122.
We Need Your Feedback
Thus, you have the first issue of the CIND (we pronounce it sin´ dee). NACIC and the counterintelligence (CI) community are aware that, in order to enhance security countermeasures and awareness programs, private industry needs adequate information on the scope of the economic threat and the information collection techniques used by foreign entities to target or exploit US private industry's personnel, technology, or facilities. Conversely, to make our partnership work, private industry must inform the CI community of their specific needs and be forthcoming in reporting foreign targeting and incident information.
Some in private industry believe that the CI community refuses to share information, and others maintain unrealistic expectations of the CI community and its products. The CIND is one attempt to better meet the needs of private industry. The overall goals of the CIND will be to:
Future CINDs will contain one or two feature articles highlighting current information on the hostile threat posed by foreign countries against the United States and will further address any number of the following topics with a focus on CI applicability:
The NACIC is working with the FBI, CIA, Department of States' Overseas Security Advisory Council, and the Defense Investigative Service in order to draw on the mechanisms they have in place for reporting CI incident information. We will compile, sanitize, analyze, coordinate, and disseminate the information for use by US Government entities and for use by private industry. This information will aid in determining trends and anomalies, and allow better use of security countermeasure resources.
While we will protect company identities and dollar-loss figures, we are at the same time obligated to protect US Government sensitive and classified information. A dialogue between the private sector and the US Government should aid in reaching a meaningful compromise wherein relevant information can be reported without adverse effect to any enterprise. Your responses to this issue of the CIND will augment that dialogue.
We do not want to be ``just another newsletter'' so we look forward to your comments and suggestions.
Counterintelligence News and Developments
Published by the National Counterintelligence Center's Threat Assessment Office, the CIND is a US Government publication and is not copyrighted. We encourage local reproduction.
Please direct inquiries and comments regarding this publication to: Voice: The Editor, CI News and Developments on, (703) 874-4119 Mail: The Editor, CI News and Developments, National Counterintelligence Center, Room 3W01 - NHB, Washington, DC 20505
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