IN WHOM WE LIVE AND MOVE
AND HAVE OUR BEING

Panentheistic Reflections on
God’s Presence in a Scientific World

Edited by
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God experiences the negative events of that world from its inside. A panentheist could reasonably affirm that such proposals generate a strong pressure to assert that the events of the world are sufficiently "in" God for God to be affected by them — but again, in what sense "in"? It is noteworthy that a wide range of theological terms in Judeo-Christian discourse has been used in various implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, panentheistic proposals to respond to this question, and not only in the context of the affirmation of divine passibility. As we shall see in the contributions that follow, these include reference to God conceived as Holy Wisdom, to the world as sacrament, to the uncreated energies of God, as well as trinitarian interpretations and the whole project of process theology.

The very use by many contemporary authors of what Philip Clayton has called the "panentheistic analogy" indicates the pressing need for a reconsideration in depth of the perennial issue of the dialectic involved in affirming both God’s transcendence over and God’s immanence in the world. This volume is offered as a substantial contribution to that enterprise.

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Naming a Quiet Revolution: The Panentheistic Turn in Modern Theology

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[The three-decker universe] has been discarded by nearly all. What are we to put in its place? Panentheism appears to supply the answer."1

Via the constructive employment of the panentheistic model, Christian thought and life are in the process of being revitalized.2

Panentheism is desperately needed by individuals and religious institutions today.3

This volume of essays attempts to review to what extent the word "panentheism" should be given a prominent place in contemporary theology. Theologians, scientists, and scientist-theologians each offer their own understanding of the word, or their response to the challenges it represents. Many of them believe, as do I and the authors of the quotations above, that panentheism holds great promise as a doctrinal and spiritual resource in the third millennium. They are conscious of what Philip Clayton has called "the panentheistic turn".

This paper is drawn from ongoing Ph.D. research at the University of Birmingham, and I am grateful to Professor Gareth Jones for his supervision.
in theology of the twentieth century, but they are aware that the word itself needs to be better known, better defined, and better understood if it is to be taken as a serious part of the world’s future theological agenda.

Donald Neil, who wrote a doctoral dissertation on panentheism in the 1970s, realized that “the time is ripe for a close study, historical and analytical, of the doctrine of panentheism”; the published version of his thesis, God in Everything, represents the first volume devoted to the word. The present essay seeks to provide a historical and analytical perspective for the present volume, the first collection of essays around “panentheism,” by surveying the use of the word in theological literature: it gives, first, an account of the dramatis personae of the panentheistic turn; second, an account of the patterns into which the use of the term seems to have fallen; and third, some suggestions as to why the “turn” might have occurred. In this way it sets the stage for the variety of responses to the word in the chapters which follow, whether or not they hold that the word is necessary or welcome.

Dramatis Personae of the Panentheistic Turn

The word “panentheism” is less well known than “pantheism,” which was coined early in the eighteenth century and came to be used by traditionalists as a term of abuse for any hint of departure from classical theism, especially when the immanence of God came to the fore of theology from the late nineteenth century to the end of the First World War. “Panentheism,” as all the standard dictionary articles testify, was coined by Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832), the German idealist philosopher and a contemporary of Hegel. Translating Krause in 1900, William Hastie commented, “His enthusiastic disciples claim for him that his system is the truest outcome of modern speculation; that it brings all contemporary knowledge and science into complete harmony; and that the Twentieth Century, understanding and appreciating Krause better than the Nineteenth Century has done, will find the certainty, security, and unity we long for in his profound rational ‘Panentheism.’” Philip Clayton suggests that idealist theologians of the early nineteenth century such as Krause developed a basic set of intuitions bequeathed by the eighteenth century, and that these intuitions themselves derived from Nicholas of Cusa’s understanding of creation occurring “within” God and Descartes’s replacement of the scholastic notion of infinitude with a participatory one.

The first use of the word in English theology appears to be on the eve of the twentieth century, by Dean Inge, in Christian Mysticism (1899), where he acknowledges the word’s origin in Krause. George Tyrrell and Friedrich von Hügel, the Catholic modernists, both used the word approvingly, and it was taken from Inge by another writer on mysticism, Brigid Herman. The word was made widely known in America through Charles Hartshorne, “the leading twentieth-century advocate of panentheism,” in particular through his reader in the doctrine of God, Philosophers Speak of God. The word was reintroduced to Britain by John Robinson, whose book Exploration into God (1967) developed the doctrinal suggestions of his controversial best-seller Honest to God (1963); and its chief exponent in Britain, though he does not like the term itself, is John Macquarrie. Macquarrie’s panentheism derived from the “existential-ontological” position of the first edition of his Principles of Christian Theology, which itself evolved from his ontological critique of the existentialists Heidegger and Bultmann.

At every stage of its entry into modern theology, panentheism has represented a middle path between two extremes, and so it has explicitly become one of the three essential types of the most fundamental of doctrines, the doctrine of God. Classical theism, pantheism, and panentheism are recognized as the basic patterns through which the doctrine of God can be analyzed. To be sure, not every doctrine of God can easily be assigned to one of these three, but even in these cases the ambiguity which the categories reveal in theologians’ doctrines of God demonstrates the categories’ validity as illuminating tools for theological understanding.

Today a whole host of theologians identify themselves as panentheists (in listing some of them here, no claim is made to be exhaustive). Some subscribe to process theism, a subset of panentheism: Hartshorne, Norman Pes, Charles Birch, Schubert Ogden, John Cobb, James Will, Jim Garrison, David Pailin, Joseph Bracken, David Griffin, Jay McDaniel, Daniel Dombrowski, and Anna Case-Winters. Others who identify themselves as panentheists include Alan Anderson, Leonardo Boff, Marcus Borg, Philip Clayton, Scott Cowdell, Denis Edwards, Paul Fiddes, Matthew Fox, Donald Gelpi, Peter Hodgson, Christopher Knight, John Macquarrie, Paul Matthews, Sally McFague, Jürgen Moltmann, Hugh Montefiore, Helen Oppenheimer, Arthur Peacocke, Piet Schoonenberg, Claude Stewart, and Kallistos Ware.

Furthermore, a number of other theologians have been identified as panentheists. These include the twentieth-century figures Nicolay Berdyaev, Peter Berger, James Bethune-Baker, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Martin Buber, Sergei Bulgakov, Rudolf Bultmann, Martin Heidegger, Karl Heim, William Hocking, Geddes MacGregor, Charles Peirce, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Albert Schweitzer, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, etc.
Chardin,83 Paul Tillich,82 Ernst Troeltsch,83 Alan Watts,84 Paul Weiss,85 and Alfred North Whitehead;86 British idealists John and Edward Caird87 and Andrew Seth Fringle-Pattison;88 nineteenth-century Germans Schleiermacher,89 Fichte,90 Hegel,91 Schelling,92 Baur,93 Fechner,94 and Pfeiderer;95 as well as the medieval theologians Nicholas of Cusa96 and Eckhart;97 the mystics Mechtild of Magdeburg98 and Julian of Norwich99 and even Luther.100 In addition, good cases could be made for very many others, not least R. J. Campbell,101 John Oman,102 John V. Taylor,103 and classic Anglican liberals such as Peter Baelz,104 Geoffrey Lampe, and Maurice Wiles.105 Whole movements have been claimed for panentheism:106 Neoplatonism,107 Orthodoxy Christianity,108 mysticism,109 and English modernism.110 Panentheism cannot therefore be dismissed as “a somewhat suspect ‘fudge’ word.”111

It would be going too far to suggest that “we are all panentheists now”;112 this cannot be sustained in the face of neo-Thomism, the contemporary credence given to such Barthianism as that propounded by Colin Gunton and John Webster,113 and postmodern “radical orthodoxy.”114 Nevertheless, the list of some adherents demonstrates that panentheism “exerts a substantial influence on contemporary theology.”115 It is claimed that the concept has biblical roots,116 and indeed is the true “orthodoxy,”117 and it has been deemed to respond more flexibly than varieties of classical theism to the concerns of feminist,118 lesbian and gay,119 ecological,120 and “economic” liberation theologies;121 the demands of dialogue between science and religion;122 and the demands of dialogue between different faiths.123 Panentheism is thus successful “in addressing a number of issues that have become of considerable importance for twenty-first century theology.”124

The most adequate way to describe the adoption of panentheism in the past two centuries, and particularly at the current time, is in terms of a doctrinal revolution. Michael Drummy uses this word (though the wrong adjective) when he posits that “particularly in the area of the doctrine of God, the accommodation by many serious Christian scholars to a ‘panentheistic’ model of the God-world relationship has amounted to a small-scale revolution in contemporary theological circles.”125 The “revolution” is not “small-scale,” because panentheism subverts the priorities of classical theism, and thereby undercuts its edifice and structure. It challenges classical theism’s imperium, and places the doctrine of God in ferment. The peculiar character of this revolution concerns not so much its far-reaching extent as its recognition. The revolution has been quiet, partly because panentheism has until recently been used by its chief exponents under other names: “dialectical theism” (Macquarrie), “neoclassical theism” (Hartshorne), “naturalistic theism” (Griffin), or the more narrow category “process theism.” The “quiet” character of the revolution is therefore like that of the twentieth century’s secret revolution in possibility, or the suffering of God, described by Ronald Goetz,126 and the rise of panentheism as a contemporary force to reckon with classical theism is thus one of the untold stories of twentieth-century theology.

Now that we are seeing the explicit emergence of panentheism as a broad doctrinal category, and the revolution is coming to attention, the questions arise: What is panentheism? What are its distinguishing features?

Some Common Panentheistic Themes

The essays in this volume demonstrate that “panentheism” covers a multitude of descriptions of the relationship between God and cosmos. There is, for example, Ware’s patristic panentheism, Bracken’s “field panentheism,” and Philip Clayton’s isolation of the distinctiveness of panentheism in the configuration of finitude and infinitude.127 Similarly, panentheists outside this volume hold different versions of the doctrine: Charles Hartshorne, for example, gave an early and detailed exposition of the concept as “ETCKW” (God as “ Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, Knowing and Including the World”);128 and David Nikkel has identified Tillich as a panentheist through Tillich’s distinctive language of “being.”129 Despite authors’ individual idiosyncrasies, it is possible to establish common ground shared by the various panentheists, not least from the vocabulary which recurs in the doctrines of the small number of theologians (“key panentheists”) who give the word itself sustained treatment: Clayton, Griffin, Hartshorne, Macquarrie, McDaniel, Pailin, and Peacocke. This common ground falls into eight different themes.

The classic definition of “panentheism” is that provided by the Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church: “the belief that the Being of God includes and penetrates the whole universe, so that every part of it exists in Him.”130 It is a weak definition, because it goes very little beyond the literal meaning of the word. The statement that God “includes” the universe merely states the literal meaning, “all in God,” with God as subject, leaving “penetration” as the only gloss on what God’s “inclusion” of the universe, or the universe’s existence “in” God, might actually mean. The question therefore remains: In what sense does the universe exist in God? It may be that this lack of precision in the meaning of the term “all in God” is responsible for some of the “tantalising ambiguities” which “seem to plague panentheistic discussion.”131

Certainly the ambiguity of “in” has caused some theologians to distinguish between different types of panentheism.132 Thus McDaniel differentiates between “emanationist” and “relational” panentheism: in “emanationist
panentheism the cosmos is a direct expression of God's own being, so that the cosmos's creative action is at the same time the creative action of God. "Relational" panentheism, for McDaniel, allows the cosmos creative independence from God, so that humanity has its own creative power. Similarly, Peterson talks of "weak" and "strong" panentheism, where the weak version refers (only) to the presence of God in the cosmos and the strong version involves some identity between them. These options, however, turn out to be superficial choices, in the light of the eight facets of panentheist language which are (largely) common to the key panentheists, and which effectively explicate the "in." The cosmos as God's body; language of "in" and through; the cosmos as sacrament; language of "in"extricable intertwining; the dependence of God on the cosmos; the intrinsic, positive value of the cosmos; possibility; and degree Christology. These features can be applied as a test to theologians to see whether or not they can be described as panentheist.

The Cosmos as God's Body

The first facet is the question of divine embodiment. Some key panentheists are content to describe the cosmos as God's body, while others are more cautious, and some come out against the idea. The concept has some attraction: the relation of mind and body, and correspondingly of God and cosmos, safeguards the distinction of each yet does not (on a psychosomatic anthropology) allow their separation; part of God can be seen and touched (leading to concern for the environment), while part nevertheless exists "beyond"; and the model also appropriately expresses a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence, God and mind each being dependent on cosmos and body, but not in the same way that cosmos and body are in turn dependent on them.

Crude objections can be easily dealt with: the claim that the cosmos is said to exist within God, or be a "part" of God, yet the body does not exist "within," nor is it a "part" of mind, is a reminder that the comparison should always be made with body and the whole person, not body and mind; and the claim that divine embodiment involves the identity of God with all aspects of the world; good and bad; is simply a non sequitur, assuming with Augustine that evil is privative.

There are, however, points where the model breaks down. For example, there are things beyond human bodies, but it is not clear what, if anything, can be said to be "beyond" the cosmos. Another weak point is that the parts of human bodies do not have conscious relations with the person who is their

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whole, unlike parts of the cosmos and God. Again, whereas it is held that God has perfect knowledge of the cosmos, human beings do not have perfect knowledge of their bodies. These caveats, however, are to be expected, since the model is an analogy: Clayton has rightly styled the model the "panentheistic analogy" (and has indeed shown that the model and the concept lie at the very root of the principle of analogy), and it is inherent in analogy that there are points where the fit between human and divine cannot be made. The original concept may be held, so long as the disanalogies are borne in mind.

Arthur Peacocke in the end comes out against divine embodiment, because he believes that conceiving of the cosmos as a "part" of God makes it of the same ontological order as God. Philip Clayton's work, however, shows how the ontological difference between God and cosmos is preserved in terms of infinitude and finitude, and perfection and imperfection, and therefore it seems right to assert with other key panentheists as part of the definition of the concept, that the cosmos is to be regarded as God's body.

Language of "In and Through"

Certain language is characteristic of the relation between person and body, and this language, through the analogy with the relationship between God and cosmos, comes to be characteristic of panentheism. For example, people are said to express themselves, or act, "in and through" their bodies: I express myself "in" my smile, or "through" the embrace of my arms. The "in" simply repeats the "in" of panentheism which needs to be explicated, but the "through" implies both the immanence of the actor and also the actor's transcendence, since for something to come, work, or act "through" something else, it needs to come from beyond it. Hence talk of God working or acting "in and through" the cosmos is language characteristic of panentheism.

Of confessed panentheists, Peacocke and Pittenger most notice this distinctive language. Peacocke draws the connection between panentheist use of this language and its use by Luther: "hence my continued need to apply the phrase 'in, with, and under' which Luther used to refer to the model of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, to the presence of God in the processes of the world." It is only a variation on "in and through": it expresses connection between agent and instrument, without their identity. Pittenger also noticed these "celebrated Lutheran prepositions," claiming that "the basic question which we must face is whether the way in which God is in fact found in that realm of creaturely occasions is of the order which may be described as 'with, in and under' (to use again the ap-
propriate words derived from Lutheran eucharistic theology) his creation, or whether it is of the order which can only be described as the entrance, ‘from outside’, of the divine reality into the creation.” Again, the use of these prepositions by prominent panentheists indicates their role as a defining characteristic of the position.148

The Cosmos as Sacrament

Peacocke’s connection of his prepositions with Luther’s use of them in discussing the Eucharist is not coincidental, for the prepositions themselves belong to the definition of a “sacrament”: a sacrament is a physical thing “under,” “in,” or “through” which God comes. The prepositions are thus intrinsic to sacramentalism (the idea that the cosmos and what is in it are sacraments), as well as to panentheism. Panentheism and sacramentalism refer to different aspects of the same reality, and sacramentalism becomes another defining characteristic of the panentheist position. In panentheism, by contrast to classical theism, the “sacraments” are not restricted to certain rites of the church: the whole cosmos, for panentheism, is sacramental, for it is something under, in, and through which God comes; and the specific sacraments of the church are simply particular intensifications of the general “sacramental principle,” signs, symbols, and reminders that any and every thing has the potential to become a full vehicle of the divine.149

The sacramental principle, like the prepositions “in, with, and under,” is recognized by Peacocke among those panentheists who define the term in depth.150 It is also noted in passing by others, including Fiddes, Fox, McFague, Pittenger, and Ware.151 It may be taken as another defining feature of the term “panentheism.”

Language of Inextricable Intertwining

If embodied things are the instruments or vehicles through which and only through which God comes and can be expressed, if embodiment, that is to say, is an intrinsic feature of divinity, as Clayton’s panentheistic analogy suggests, then the two, God and cosmos, while distinct from one another, cannot be separate. Subject and object are distinct entities but can never entirely be divorced, one from the other, since they are interdependent. This means not only that they are “inextricably intertwined,” but that this inextricable intertwining is also an intrinsic and therefore defining feature of their reality. Once again it is a case of certain language being characteristic of the panentheistic position: the presence of terms such as “distinct but not separate,” or “inextricably intertwined,” is evidence that the position which underlies them is panentheistic.

So, for example, Macquarrie makes clear that the cosmos is not “separate” from God.152 His whole scheme of “dialectics,” as Hartshorne’s doctrine of “dipolarity,” is an attempt to express the necessary link (or, in Hartshorne’s word, “correlativeness”) between sets of distinct poles. Clayton talks of the identification and the distinction, the inclusion and the separation, of God and cosmos.154 Boff says God and cosmos are “always intertwined.”155 Pittenger was sufficiently aware of “the difference between distinction and separation, a difference often overlooked by theologians and philosophers,” to apply “inextricable intertwining” to a whole range of subjects, including object and subject, event and reception, and fact and interpretation.156 The use of such language, once again, becomes one of the hallmarks by which panentheism is identified.

God’s Dependence on the Cosmos

If embodiment is indeed an intrinsic feature of divinity, and if indeed the interconnections between God and cosmos cannot be completely undone, then this leads to the unorthodox assertion that God is dependent on the cosmos.157 God needs the cosmos for the fulfillment of God’s nature of love.

Some panentheists (notably those under the process influence) have urged a careful distinction here: they have suggested that if divine embodiment is indispensable, God needs a cosmos but not necessarily the cosmos, in the sense of this particular one.158 In other words, God needs “somebody to love,” but the “somebody” could conceivably have been a very different universe. Paul Fiddes is right to be uneasy about this proposal, arguing that particularity is intrinsic to the desire and need of love.159 God, it could be said, needs and is dependent on the particular cosmos that is in the process of becoming. This can be accepted, as long as it is recognized that this cosmos could have been a very different one.

Panentheists who are less ready than process theists to jettison Christian tradition express a certain hesitancy over the dependency of God on the cosmos. Macquarrie, for example, claims “it is a misuse of language to say that it is necessary for [God] to create,” because he feels that the language of “necessity” implies a coercive force external to God. He prefers to state that God freely creates, because on the Augustinian view of freedom to act freely is to act within the constraints of perfect love, and so to act within one’s ulti-
mate nature: in God's relationship with the cosmos, freedom and necessity, creation and emanation, will and love, coincide. By Macquarrie's own admission, however, the language of "freedom" is susceptible to the misinterpretation that God could have acted otherwise. Given, therefore, that the language of "freedom" and the language of "necessity" are both open to misinterpretation, there does not seem to be any reason why the language of necessity may not be used, with the proviso that this does not mean that God is under some kind of external compulsion.

Just as one key panentheist, Peacock, resisted the notion of divine embodiment, so another key panentheist (other than Macquarrie), Clayton, resists the notion of a necessary divine dependence on the world. Whereas Fiddes is keen to keep divine will and divine nature free from subordination to each other, Clayton, under the influence of Schelling, is content to subordinate God's nature of love to God's freedom or will: hence the cosmos represents the preexistent God's free choice to create, and God, who can exist without a cosmos, is only dependent on it after this free decision. Clayton states that "the reason [for this position] is a logical one: the claim that 'a contingent world must of necessity exist' is, I think, incoherent." But it may be precisely that God, through love, needs a world that (by nature) is radically dependent on God. Some such association of necessity and dependence would therefore be entailed by God's love. Clayton again: "one can't use the difference in natures between God and world (necessary vs. contingent) to defend use of the panentheistic analogy... and at the same time maintain that it was eternally necessary that God create a world." But if divine love qualifies necessity and contingency as qualities which distinguish between God and cosmos, then other qualities for distinguishing between the natures remain: infinitude and finitude, perfection and imperfection. Love demands that God and cosmos are both in some way dependent on, and necessary to, the other; but the difference in natures demands that they are not dependent on, and necessary to, the other in the same way. This would seem to be consistent with Clayton's insistence that divine embodiment is indispensable, and Clayton's position would therefore be more secure if his interpretation of freedom followed more Augustinian lines, as for Macquarrie and Moltmann, so that God was indeed freely dependent on the cosmos, with no other option and without any outside force.

The Intrinsic, Positive Value of the Cosmos

Another corollary of panentheism is that as God is good, so God's body is good: the physical material "in and through" which God operates is fundamentally positive. That which is a part of God shares the same basic value as God's self. In this, panentheism breaks the long suspicion of Christian tradition, under the influence of classical theism, of all things physical.

It is possible for panentheism not to go this far. Clayton, for example, implies that the world created by God is neutral, and that no judgments about its intrinsic value can be made. Similarly, panentheisms which do not hold evil to be privative might understand the evil of the cosmos to be "in" God and a part of God, just as much as the good. Clayton rightly notes that on this type of reading, panentheism offers no assistance with theodicy, since God remains ultimately responsible for evil, as in classical theism: it does not ease the problem of evil, but neither does it make it worse. Most panentheisms, however, would subscribe, after Augustine, to a privative view of evil. On this view evil is a lack of good, a negation which plagues and infects the cosmos: God works in and through the good of the cosmos to eliminate this blight, and bring the cosmos to the fullness of glory. The intrinsic, positive value to the cosmos can therefore be taken as a defining characteristic of the doctrine.

Possibility

God and the cosmos have an unusual relationship in that they do not simply relate as two personal lovers, but the latter is also the body of the former. Both facets - the nature of the relationship as love, and divine embodiment - imply that God suffers: the former because it is in the nature of authentic love to suffer the response of the beloved, and the latter because when a body suffers, the corresponding person suffers. These arguments are respectively the ontological and the immanental arguments for possibility, the doctrine that God suffers. Because these arguments for possibility stem from panentheistic principles, panentheism entails possibility. There are other grounds for holding that God is possible, so panentheism does not lie behind every instance of possibility; but because of the connections between the two, possibility, in the course of its twenty-century rise, has often led to panentheism.

The recognized rise of possibility means that it is one of the most common marks of panentheism when panentheism is discussed. Possibility is held by Fiddes, Griffin, Hartshorne, Macquarrie, McDaniel, McFague, Moltmann, Pailin, Peacock, and Pittenger, among others.
Panentheists make natural "degree christologists." That is to say, those who hold a panentheistic model of God tend to think of Christ as different from other persons by degree rather than kind. This is because if God is somehow "in" the cosmos generally, then God's work in Christ needs to be related with some continuity to that cosmic work, and not isolated from it; else there is an unpanentheistic dichotomy between God in Christ and the rest of the cosmos.\textsuperscript{183} Because such a Christology issues from a panentheistic position, the identification of a person's Christology as a "degree Christology" is good evidence that the person holds to a panentheistic doctrine of God.\textsuperscript{184}

Not many panentheists have made this connection. Degree Christology is, however, explicitly claimed by John Robinson\textsuperscript{185} and Macquarrie,\textsuperscript{186} and the work of Griffin strongly implies a Christology where the mode of divine presence or agency in Christ does not differ metaphysically from its operation in others.\textsuperscript{187} Similarly, Peacocke gives a Christology that while not named as such, is clearly in the "degree" mold,\textsuperscript{188} and McFague argues that "Jesus is not ontologically different from other paradigmatic figures either in our tradition or in other religious traditions who manifest in word and deed the love of God for the world."\textsuperscript{189} The panentheist who subscribes most explicitly to a degree Christology is Norman Pittenger, who advocated the doctrine early in his career,\textsuperscript{190} gave it sustained treatment in an essay of 1956,\textsuperscript{191} and maintained the position in his two works on Christology, the first of which was one of the earliest applications of process thought to Christology, and widely respected.\textsuperscript{192}

Conclusion

What is needed, perhaps, is not an abandonment of panentheism but the reconsideration of existing metaphors as well as the development of new ones.\textsuperscript{193}

The eight features above, largely common to key panentheists, yield a definition of panentheism which can be taken not only as a summary of the doctrine as it has emerged thus far but also as a yardstick for measuring individual varieties and strains of the doctrine, not least those espoused by the contributors to this volume. That is to say, panentheism can be defined as the doctrine of the cosmos being the good (against Clayton) "body" (against Peacocke), or "sacrament," needed by God (against Clayton), with which God is inextricably intertwined, and "in and through" which God works and suffers. The doctrine involves a degree Christology.\textsuperscript{194} It is necessary to emphasize again that not of all these features will be explicit in the work of every panentheist, but the presence of a good proportion will indicate to which of the three basic doctrines of God a given theologian's ideas can be assigned.

Why, then, has the doctrine emerged? What historically are the pressures which have led to its adoption? It cannot be coincidence that the earliest conceptions of the doctrine, both implicit and explicit, came from the idealists of the nineteenth century. The rise of panentheism mirrors the rise of passibility, in that both were developed in Britain and the States under the influence of the German idealists.\textsuperscript{195} Moreover, the panentheist revolution mirrors the passibilist revolution in being driven forward by experiences of suffering: just as it can be no coincidence that panentheism gained popularity in a century which sought to reinterpret the love of God in the face of world-wide suffering.\textsuperscript{196}

Insofar as idealism represented theology's assimilation of evolutionary values, it is possible to see panentheism as the theological response to science and the Enlightenment. It might be rash, however, to deduce that science was the ultimate historical pressure for the panentheist revolution. For rationalism itself, like mysticism, is a way of ordering human experience, and mysticism testifies to the panentheistic character of the deepest human religious experience. This suggests that the outworking of panentheism in doctrinal terms, like evolutionary science, was a reaction against the static resonances, either inherent or perceived, which emanated from the prevailing classical, "substance" ways of thinking, in line with the relationality of humanity's deepest experience. That is to say, the changes both scientifically and theologically may have resulted from a fundamental shift in ontology, from a "substance ontology," to a "relational ontology."\textsuperscript{197} Classical theism tended to conceive of God and the world as substances, which would always make it difficult to relate the two, since substances are essentially spatial and cannot overlap. Panentheism is the result of conceiving "being" in terms of relationship or relatedness.\textsuperscript{198} This is why process theism is a type of panentheism, for "process" asserts that "entities" are inseparably interrelated, and thus that relationship, rather than substance, is "of the essence."\textsuperscript{199}

This is not to say that classical theism is not capable of refining itself in subtle and sophisticated ways which make dynamism more central to its system.\textsuperscript{200} The ultimate question is whether it is better to state with qualifications that the cosmos is in God or with qualifications that the cosmos is not in God. It has been argued that the former option is to be preferred on three grounds: first, that even though classical theism has on occasion been made...
into a target of straw by panentheists, just as panentheism has been by classical theists, nevertheless the caricature of classical theism does tend to represent what the classical view has conveyed to the popular mind, and therefore the picture of God that people seem generally to have believed; second, that despite the caricature of classical theism that seems to have been widely assimilated, the panentheistic model in fact more accurately expresses than classical theism the basic religious conviction of humanity; and third, that the panentheistic way of expressing things has greater moral potential for the world.

This moral potential of panentheism is seen in its affinity with liberation theologies, which insist on replacing relationships of domination with ones of genuine reciprocity. Panentheism is the result of process, mutuality, reciprocity or love, being made foundational to "being." This is why "love," as a term expressing relation, is such an important concept for process theologians, and why attention to love has been the cause of much doctrinal revisionism. There is some asymmetry in the relation between God and cosmos, because the infinite is not dependent on the finite in the same way that the finite is dependent on the infinite. Nevertheless, the mutuality in the relationship under panentheism is genuine. Again, classical theism would also claim that "love" is at the center of its doctrine of God. Yet this love is agapé—pure beneficence, needing no love in return—whereas panentheism would conceive of love as an inextricable mix of agapé and eros, as the interdependence of giving and receiving. Thus the difference between classical theism and panentheism comes back to a difference of human experience, namely, which of these loves experienced by humanity, agapé or agapé-eros, is the deeper symbol of the love of God, and this confirms human experience as the prompt for the rise in panentheistic doctrine.

One of the features of panentheism that has received no recognition is its particular strain of ecclesiology, and it is ecclesiology that holds the clue to the whole purpose in naming the panentheist revolution. The ecclesiology distinctive to panentheism is the doctrine of the church as that which names God and God's activity. On a classical model the church is the "ark of salvation"; those who clamber on board out of the evil world will arrive at God's goodness in heaven. If, however, as panentheism maintains, God's goodness is at work more diffusively in the world, then the church can have no monopoly on goodness or salvation. What makes the church distinctive, therefore, is its task in relation to the mixture of good and evil to be found throughout both itself and the world: and that task is to realize more goodness through its own inheritance of faith and worship; that is to say, its tradition and language are to be used to increase salvation in the world. Thus the application of its lan-