I. Introduction: What is IC21? During the 104th Congress, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has undertaken a major review of the role, functions and structure of the Intelligence Community. This review has been called The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, or IC21. This title connotes one of the major premises of the study: that the Intelligence Community (IC) has been largely, and perhaps inevitably, shaped by the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. This struggle gave shape to a specific set of "intelligence norms," i.e., organizations, products, practices, relationships and ways of doing business that extend throughout the IC. Some of these intelligence norms are likely to be fairly stable, regardless of U.S. national security policy or the international political environment. Others may be outdated and no longer responsive to U.S. national security requirements as we enter the 21st century. IC21 seeks to determine which of these intelligence norms are still relevant, which need to be either revised or replaced, and what alternatives there are to be added. II. Guiding Concepts IC21 has been guided by the following broad concepts: The United States continues to need a strong, highly capable and increasingly flexible IC. This need has not diminished with the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the current international situation is, in many ways, more complex and more difficult to deal with than was the relatively stable bi-polar Cold War. Thus, although we find our national security less threatened, the demands for intelligence remain. The focus of our national security has changed, but the mission of the IC has not changed: providing timely, assessed intelligence to civil and military policy-makers, supporting military operations and carrying out certain operations -- including covert action -- as tasked by legally responsible officials. A key issue is opportunity, not reform. As noted, U.S. national security interests are less threatened than at any time since 1940. This is a propitious moment in which to review major aspects of our national security apparatus and to update them in an atmosphere relatively free from crises. Although Congress and the Executive continue to deal with issues of the propriety of certain operations, oversight and -- occasionally -- legality, these are not the main driving issues as they were in the mid-1970s. Everything is on the table. There are no sacred cows in terms of organizations, missions or functions. Neither are there any preconceptions as to the "right answer" for the future of the IC. IC21 is not an exercise designed to reduce, or even to shape the intelligence budget. The goal is to define the type of IC that will best meet U.S. national security needs into the next century. The question of whether the price for this type of IC is acceptable can only be decided by Congress and the Executive during their budget deliberations. IC21 is not simply an effort to reorganize the IC. Any major recommendation for organizational change must come only from well-defined intelligence or policy-maker needs. Although the Committee's purview over the IC is fairly broad, it is important to keep its primary focus on those issues that might require legislative remedies. Changes that can be carried out by or within the Executive should also be noted, as should findings for which no specific recommendations are made. Any changes must result in improved processes or products to be worth the cost of short-lived dislocations. To the greatest extent possible, the IC21 process should be public and unclassified. One of the goals of IC21 is to renew a national consensus to support a strong and capable IC. Such a consensus must rely on an easily accessible body of information. This is an especially important function for, as several witnesses have told the Committee, beyond Congress and the Executive, there is no natural constituency for intelligence in the United States. Finally, the focus must be on where the IC needs to be in the next 10-15 years, not a snapshot of where we are today. III. Methodology After much preliminary staff study -- aided by a set of detailed questions sent out to over 40 former and current officials with national security experience, academics, and IC veterans -- the Committee undertook IC21 with the view that it would be most profitable to look at the IC largely in terms of functions across the board, rather than agency-by-agency. It was felt that an agency-by-agency approach would lead to either a confirmation or rejection of the status quo without providing a basis for projecting future intelligence needs and how best to meet them. This functional concept has been pursued along a number of parallel paths. Figure 1 indicates the major IC functions as defined in the IC21 studies. They are aggregated into three broad groups: management, execution and infrastructure. Figure 1: IC Functional Flow Second, the Committee has held six full committee hearings devoted to IC21 issues (see Appendix A for a list of hearings and witnesses). All but one of these hearings have been held in open session, in keeping with the envisioned role of IC21 as a means of building a strong public consensus for intelligence. Third, Committee staff undertook the 14 studies presented in this volume. As Figure 2 indicates, these studies encompass issues within the broad areas of direction of the IC; intelligence requirements; and collection, analysis and operations. There are no staff studies specifically on intelligence products, although these products clearly would be affected by the recommendations in the staff studies. Figure 2: IC21 Staff Studies Fourth, Committee staff has held 12 formal staff panels with various expert witnesses as part of the background work on the studies. Committee staff also conducted numerous interviews with national security, intelligence and technology specialists in and out of the government on issues specific to the studies. (See Appendix B for a list of staff panels.) Fifth, the Committee's extensive work on the FY 1996 intelligence budget authorization also yielded a great deal of information relevant to IC21 issues. This work covered both functional issues and concerns of specific agencies. The Committee held 11 authorization hearings, over 20 Member briefings and more than 200 staff briefings as part of that process. Finally, the Committee has kept in close touch with other efforts that are re-examining the IC. Chief among these is the commission headed by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and, prior to him, the late former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. Two members of that commission are also Members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The staffs of the Committee and the commission have also been in contact throughout the past year. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Council on Foreign Relations have also been examining some of these same issues. Again, there have been ongoing contact among all of these groups. IV. Findings and Recommendations: Introduction At the outset of IC21 we recognized that we were likely to arrive at a varied set of findings and recommendations, some of which might entail legislation, while others would not. Although our primary focus was and is on areas where Congress can make positive changes and improvements through legislation, we also did not want those other recommendations to be omitted. Therefore, Findings and Recommendations are divided into two groups, the first being those that are being introduced as a bill with a view to action by the Congress, the second being those that we believe the Executive should consider for action on its own. Overarching Concept: The Need for IC "Corporateness". Throughout the IC21 process we were struck by the success of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the Defense Department in 1986, and we continually referred back to them. Key to the success of Goldwater-Nichols was a central unifying concept: "jointness," the idea that the individual services had to improve cooperation and that a stronger JCS was a major means towards this end. The IC as we know it today is the result of half a century of ad hoc development. Each agency or organization makes sense on its own, but if one were to design an IC today from scratch, this is not likely to be the array that would be chosen. Only intelligence, of all major government functions, is carried out by a very disparate number of agencies and organizations that are either independent of one another or housed in separate departments headed by officials whose main concerns are policy, not intelligence. Indeed, referring to it as a "community" is more accurate than most people realize, capturing as it does a sense of mutuality and independence. We believe that the IC has served the nation well, but that given the opportunity we now have to review the functioning of the IC, we can take steps to rationalize some of its functions, to remove some redundancies, to give it greater flexibility and responsiveness to policy maker needs and, above all, to give it a coherence that it has not had. Indeed, unless one looks at the intelligence process as an integrated whole working towards an agreed end, the IC makes little sense and can become, in its individual parts, self-serving. We have concluded that a major key to an improved IC is the concept of "corporateness," i.e., for the agencies and employees of the IC to run, to function and to behave as part of a more closely integrated enterprise working towards a highly defined common end: the delivery of timely intelligence to civil and military decision makers at various levels. We believe that this higher sense of corporate identity can be achieved without sacrificing services or functions properly designed to serve more parochial intelligence needs. FINDING: The IC should put greater emphasis on functioning as a true corporate enterprise, in which all components understand that they are part of a larger coherent process aiming at a single goal: the delivery of timely intelligence to policy makers at various levels. V. Findings and Recommendations: Legislative Proposal How the IC is organized and managed is a key set of issues. Ironically, many of the issues in this category studied by IC21 are among the oldest that have faced the IC, often without any conclusive debate. The longevity of many of these management and structural issues strongly suggests that difficult choices rather than definitive answers are the most likely outcomes as the IC attempts to reshape itself to face new national security issues. Rather than deal with these issues individually and repeat these old debates, IC21 gave considerable thought to the broader problems of managing the IC. The Role of the DCI. Looked at in very simple terms, intelligence consists of three basic tasks: collection, analysis and covert action. But none of these, with the exception of covert action, is carried out exclusively by one agency. Nor does the senior responsible official, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), directly control -- either across the IC or even within its non-military portion -- all of those agencies that contribute to these three functions. Ultimately, the components of the IC become internecine competitors. This is most often seen in debates over budgets, but it also becomes apparent in competition among the three functions and within each of them as well. The role of the DCI is central to this debate. There are two stark choices that would remedy this situation: (1) admit that the concepts of a DCI, of central intelligence and of competitive analysis have not worked and return to a more fractionated intelligence establishment in which components serve their individual policy customers; or (2) attempt to strengthen the central aspects of the IC without losing those facets of individual intelligence service that remain vital. It is the strong conclusion of IC21 that this second choice, attempting to buttress stronger central features while retaining important independent functions, is the right answer. FINDING: The IC would benefit greatly from a more corporate approach to its basic functions. Central management should be strengthened, core competencies (collection, analysis, operations) should be reinforced and infrastructure should be consolidated wherever possible. The role of the DCI is of the utmost importance to achieving this goal. There are two broad areas at stake: (1) the role of the DCI vis-a-vis the President; and (2) the DCI's role within the IC. Several witnesses, including several past DCIs and Deputy DCIs, noted that the degree to which the DCI visibly commands the respect and confidence of the President is central to the DCI's effectiveness. Realistically, however, there is no way to mandate or to legislate a close working relationship between these two officials. Two suggestions repeatedly surface regarding the status of the DCI. The first is that he be made a cabinet-rank official. The second is that he be given a fixed term of office. IC21 does not believe that either of these has sufficient merit or would achieve the goal of a stronger DCI. A third suggestion is that he be relieved of his responsibilities for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and elevated to a position over the entire IC. Cabinet-rank for officials who are not members of the Cabinet (i.e., the heads of departments) is merely an honorific. The United States does not have Cabinet government; being designated a member of the Cabinet does not in any real sense increase one's authority. It certainly will not enhance or improve the DCI's relationship with the President, which can only be based on a level of trust and confidence. Indeed, mandating Cabinet-rank for the DCI while doing anything less than creating a true Intelligence Department -- which no one has contemplated -- only calls more attention to the disparity between the DCI's responsibilities and his authority, even with the enhancements being proposed here. The importance of the DCI's personal relationship with the President is also the main argument against a fixed term. Proponents of a fixed term argue that this would have several benefits. Ten years is often suggested, as has been done with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). First, and perhaps foremost, a fixed term would provide for greater continuity and stability than we now have. Until 1977, it was not customary for the DCI to be replaced with a new administration. That is no longer the case. Moreover, the DCI's position has since been subjected to fairly frequent turn-overs over and above presidential transitions. From 1973-1977 there were five DCIs; from 1991-1996 there have been four DCIs. However, a fixed term could create the situation where a President would inherit a DCI with whom he could not work. Although there would be greater continuity, the DCI's effectiveness would diminish rapidly, a far greater loss. As noted, an analogy is often drawn to the Director of the FBI. The comparison is inapt. First, the ten year term for the FBI Director was enacted to limit tenure, not to ensure continuity from one administration to the next. Second, the DCI is the chief intelligence officer and deals directly with the President. The Director of the FBI is not the chief law enforcement officer; the Attorney General is and serves at the President's pleasure. In sum, a fixed term would not be an improvement. The National Security Act states that the DCI is the head of the IC and the President's principal intelligence adviser. Neither of these designations for the DCI is the same as meaningful control. If the IC is to achieve a greater degree of centrality and corporate identity, then the role of the DCI has to be changed. The glaring gap between his responsibilities and his authorities has to be closed to the greatest extent possible. The DCI should be viewed as a chief executive officer (CEO) of the IC, with purview over all of its major functions and a greater degree of control over budgets, resources and major policy issues that are common to all agencies. To do this in a more coherent and more meaningful manner, the DCI needs managerial resources dedicated to the operations of the entire IC -- a strengthened Community Management Staff (CMS) -- and more authorities than are available to him today. FINDING: The DCI requires additional authorities in order to manage the IC as a corporate entity. Further, the DCI can only be effective in his job if he has a close working relationship with the President and a strong bureaucratic base of his own. "Cabinet status" for the DCI is largely irrelevant and actually may be harmful. As noted, we do not find major flaws in the broader parameters of the role of the DCI as currently described in legislation in terms of his tenure or his responsibility for the CIA. Indeed, the testimony of former DCIs and other former senior IC officials all concur that the DCI needs an agency "of his own" -- i.e., the CIA -- if he is to have any real power within the IC. Therefore, we would expand and strengthen the DCI's authorities to include organizational changes that follow. RECOMMENDATION: The DCI should continue to serve at the pleasure of the President, shall exercise direct control over the Clandestine Service, and continue to exercise control over the CIA and the CMS via his deputies. If the IC is going to achieve the goal of "corporateness," and if the DCI is going to function as a true CEO, then he should have a greater say in the selection of his "corporate team" -- the heads of the other major intelligence components. Current law requires that the Secretary of Defense "consult" with the DCI in naming heads for National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) defense agencies. Although it is unlikely that the Secretary of Defense would nominate someone to whom the DCI is strongly opposed, it is possible. Instead, the DCI's concurrence should be sought. In the unlikely event of disagreement, the issue could be referred to the National Security Council (NSC) Committee on Foreign Intelligence (see below) or, ultimately, to the President. But the importance of a truly corporate team requires a stronger DCI voice in this process. A similar case could be made regarding the selection of the heads of the departmental intelligence units in the Departments of State, Energy and Treasury. We concentrated only on the Defense NFIP agencies because of the larger importance and role of these entities within the IC, especially in the area of collection, which cannot be claimed by these non-Defense intelligence offices. This aspect of the relationship between the IC and Defense, as well as the changing, more dynamic use of intelligence in military operations, warrant this step. RECOMMENDATION: In order to create a corporate intelligence team, the DCI should have a stronger voice in the appointment of directors of NFIP Defense agencies. The Secretary of Defense should obtain the concurrence of the DCI in these appointments. It is a Washington truism that the power to shape and control budgets is the essential bureaucratic lever for any manager. The IC budget is currently divided into three major parts: NFIP: The National Foreign Intelligence Program, comprised of the entire CIA budget and the national foreign intelligence or counterintelligence programs of the Defense Department; Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); National Security Agency (NSA); the Central Imagery Office (CIO); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force; the Departments of State, Treasury and Energy; the FBI; and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). JMIP: The Joint Military Intelligence Program, comprised of defense intelligence elements that support defense-wide or theater-level needs. TIARA: The Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities, comprised of the array of reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a functional part of the basic military force structure and provide direct information support to military operations. This organization may make the overall IC budget more manageable, but it also has the effect of atomizing it into areas that are treated as distinct and separate entities, rather than as parts of a larger whole. This arrangement makes it very difficult to oversee intelligence as an end-to-end process or as a corporate entity. FINDING: IC management has been unable to look at activities, budgets and programs on an IC-wide basis. Instead, these have been looked at as three distinct blocks: NFIP, JMIP and TIARA. Although the DCI has IC-wide responsibilities, only the NFIP comes directly under his purview. Within the NFIP budget, however, the individual program managers, i.e., those people who are responsible for developing and overseeing the various NFIP programs, have a great deal of power, so much so that the NFIP is more an aggregation of a variety of types of activities (some agencies, some collection disciplines, some management activities, etc.) rather than a coherent whole. FINDING: The DCI lacks the requisite authorities over the NFIP program managers so that he can manage the IC as a corporate entity. The DCI's ability to control the NFIP budget is also complicated by the fact that a substantial number of organizations included in the NFIP are part of the Defense Department. Thus, it is crucial that the DCI be able to work closely with the Secretary of Defense, whose day-to-day control over intelligence dollars and personnel actually exceeds that of the DCI. FINDING: The vast majority of the NFIP budget is within the Defense budget. The DCI should have increased programmatic control commensurate with his intelligence responsibilities, but can only do so with the cooperation of the Secretary of Defense. If the DCI is going to manage the IC on a more corporate basis, then he needs greater authority over the program managers. Similarly, only the DCI has the IC-wide oversight and responsibility to look at the budget as a whole, over and beyond these separate programs. He should have the authority to transfer limited amounts of money between NFIP programs or agencies without the programs manager's approval. Inevitably, there will be a need to appeal such decisions. This can either be done directly with the Secretary of Defense or, if necessary, within the NSC Committee on Foreign Intelligence (see below). RECOMMENDATION: Section 104(d) of the National Security Act should be changed so that the DCI can transfer limited amounts of money between NFIP programs or agencies without the program manager's approval. People are the key element of the IC. All of the collection capabilities are machines unless there are dedicated people behind them -- building them, operating them, processing the data, analyzing it. In the area of personnel management we find, again, that there are gaps between the DCI's responsibility and his current authority. At present, only the personnel at CIA are under his control. If he sees an intelligence need that can best be filled elsewhere, he can ask for those people, but he cannot be assured of getting them. In an era in which much greater emphasis is being put on multi-disciplinary analysis and on the use of IC centers (see below), this lack of authority becomes debilitating. The DCI should have authority over all NFIP agency personnel, including the right to assign them where they are most needed. RECOMMENDATION: Expand the authority of the DCI over personnel in all NFIP agencies. This should include the ability to detail personnel from one agency to another, as needed, to best meet IC and policy maker requirements. It should also expand the DCI's termination authority to all NFIP agencies. NSC Supervision: Committee on Foreign Intelligence. As noted, the National Security Act designates the DCI as the President's principal adviser on intelligence. This act also places the DCI under direction of the NSC. The NSC is composed of four officials: the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The IC is a service organization. It has no meaning without its relationship to policy makers. Thus, the DCI must have regular contact with the NSC members. However, it is not reasonable to expect that they can give the DCI and, through him, the IC, the kind of regular executive guidance that was envisioned by the National Security Act. Indeed, in each successive Administration, there has been some sort of sub-NSC group created to deal with intelligence, reflecting the shortcomings of the NSC itself to carry out this role. FINDING: Although the DCI should remain under the statutory direction of the NSC, that body itself is rarely capable of providing the consistent high-level guidance that is required. Of the various sub-NSC bodies that have been created to deal with intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) created by President Ford in 1976 appeared to be among the more successful, in terms of its stated role, its membership and its performance. Interestingly, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence proposed re-establishing this group in legislation in 1992, as has the Aspin-Brown Commission. We believe that the CFI, properly constituted and empowered, can more usefully serve as a body to provide the DCI and the IC with the necessary guidance and policy-maker oversight. This is not meant to supplant the DCI's current direct access to the NSC members; it is meant to give the DCI access on a more regular basis to senior policy-makers who can give direction to the IC and can listen to and relay IC concerns. RECOMMENDATION: The DCI is the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters, and operates under the direction of the NSC. RECOMMENDATION: Within the NSC, reestablish a Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) to provide more regular policy guidance, feedback and executive oversight to the DCI. RECOMMENDATION: The CFI would be comprised of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who should be the CFI chairman; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Chairman of the JCS; the DCI; and the Attorney General, or their deputies. Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence. We envision that the DCI would continue to have two major responsibilities: for the IC and, within it, for the components that today constitute the CIA. All DCIs have found this a broad and sometimes difficult mandate. Each DCI has shown a preference for one aspect of his job or the other. The ability to delegate is important, although it has been done differently by virtually each DCI. The current DCI, for example, relies on two executive directors -- one for the CIA and one for the CMS. Their titles belie their responsibilities. The positions responsible for these two large parts of the DCI's portfolio should be enhanced and their duties better defined. Some permanence in the DCI's supporting structure is needed and can be achieved without losing necessary flexibility. It also allows for greater institutional continuity, clearer definition of responsibilities and improved congressional oversight. In order to minimize superfluous bureaucratic layering, one Deputy DCI (DDCI) should specifically be given day-to-day responsibility for the CIA, whose enhanced analytical responsibilities are discussed below. This would reduce layering, would continue to give the DCI direct access to his major bureaucratic and institutional base, and yet would relieve the DCI of many lesser administrative concerns. In addition, there should be a second DDCI for Community Management, for much the same reasons, with purview over the collection, acquisition and infrastructure elements of the IC. As noted above, the importance of the DCI's relationship with the President is such that few prerequisites for nominees should be imposed. However, to the extent possible, these DDCI positions should be considered as professional as well as political appointments and should go to individuals with extensive national security or intelligence background. This is especially important if a DCI with less such background is chosen. Given the important of these positions, the two DDCIs should be confirmed by the Senate, just as is the current DDCI position. RECOMMENDATION: Create an additional DDCI position. RECOMMENDATION: One DDCI will direct the CIA and, to promote corporateness, be responsible for managing all IC analysis and production. RECOMMENDATION: To further promote corporateness, a DDCI for community management (DDCI/CM) will -- oversee the CMS and -- be responsible for IC-wide budgeting, requirements and collection management and tasking, consolidated infrastructure management (in the new Infrastructure Support Office -- see below) and system acquisition. RECOMMENDATION: The DCI will designate one of DDCIs to serve as the Acting DCI in his absence. The National Security Act currently mandates that either the DCI or the DDCI can be an active duty military officer, but at no time can both be active duty military officers. We believe this is a sound provision, and would extend it to include the additional DDCI as well. RECOMMENDATION: Both DDCIs should have extensive national security experience; both will be confirmed by the Senate. At no time may more than one of these three (DCI, two DDCIs) be an active duty military officer. The growth and development of the IC into distinct agencies has led to unwarranted duplication in what are, essentially, administrative and logistical functions. This is not only duplicative and costly, but also can harm the ability of the IC to operate as a corporate whole. There is no reason why many of these services cannot be merged and run by a single entity -- a new Infrastructure Support Office (ISO). RECOMMENDATION: Consolidate and rationalize management of infrastructure and services of common concern across the IC. These should include at least personnel management, community-level training, security, information systems and communications, managed by the ISO, reporting to the DDCI/CM. Director of Military Intelligence. The Defense Department -- civilian policy makers and military services at all levels -- is one of the largest components and most important customers of the IC. Many of the larger organizational issues noted for the IC at large are also found within the defense-related part of the IC. Enhancing the DCI's authority solves some, but not all, of the problems. It is important that the defense intelligence establishment also have a single official who is both responsible for and empowered to address these issues. We believe that this should be a uniformed officer, carrying the title of Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). FINDING: In addition to a strengthened DCI, there should be a DMI with increased authority over non-NFIP defense intelligence programs and direct access to the Secretary of Defense. Like the DCI, the DMI also requires a bureaucratic and institutional base, in this case the DIA. RECOMMENDATION: The Director of DIA is to be formally designated as Director of Military Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense's senior uniformed military intelligence officer. Some have raised the concern that such a designation, while buttressing defense intelligence, could over-empower the DMI, making him a difficult rival to the DCI. We do not believe that this is likely, given the broader authority of the DCI for all IC-wide activities. RECOMMENDATION: The DMI is a senior member of the U.S. Intelligence Community and will be accountable to the DCI in all matters relative to the IC. Clearer responsibility should also be given for JMIP and TIARA. Given that these are not national programs, but are focused more exclusively on military needs, the most logical candidate for this would be the DMI. The DMI should not only be responsible for the JMIP budget, but should also oversee how TIARA is connected to and interacts with NFIP and JMIP. FINDING: The NFIP, JMIP and TIARA budgets should be retained but rationalized. The DMI should be responsible for building the JMIP and overseeing how TIARA connects to and interacts with NFIP and JMIP. The DMI's authority over budgets is crucial to his success. The DMI should have broad authority over the two major parts of the defense intelligence budget, the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the Tactical and Intelligence-Related Activities (TIARA). The DMI, through his DMI staff, which works closely with the CMS, ensures that JMIP and TIARA are coordinated with the NFIP in looking at an overall IC budget. RECOMMENDATION: The DMI will be the program manager of the JMIP and program coordinator for TIARA. Community All-Source Analysis. The ability to collect a variety of information on issues or questions from multiple sources is one of the major strengths of the U.S. IC. It gives breadth and greater credibility to analysis. "All-source" analysis, properly done, is of tremendous service to decision-makers. The CIA, which would now be directed by the DDCI, was envisioned by President Truman as a coordinator of disparate intelligence being produced by other agencies. The CIA quickly became a producer in its own right because of policy-maker demands, the unwillingness of then-existent agencies to respond, and an aggressive CIA leadership. Although this is different than President Truman's vision, we do not believe that this development should be reversed. Indeed, it would appear more profitable to underscore the CIA's analytical role by confirming it as the premier all-source (i.e., deriving its analysis from all intelligence collection disciplines) analytical agency within the IC. No other agency -- DIA, State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) -- can credibly make that claim. RECOMMENDATION: The CIA's role as the premier all-source analytical agency should be reinforced and underscored. We concur with the observation of former DCI Richard Helms that the President needs his own analytical group and that if we did not have the CIA today we would probably invent it. Underscoring this role means more than words. The CIA should include not only its analysts, but a significant number of second- and third-tier exploiters of the various intelligence collection disciplines. By bringing them closer together we can achieve a true synergy between collection and analytical production, rather than keeping them separate to the point where they sometimes seem like competitors rather than parts of a larger corporate process. RECOMMENDATION: To do so, the CIA should house not only analysts, but also second- and third-tier exploiters of the various collection disciplines, in order to create a true synergy between collection and production. Confirming this role for the CIA is not meant to diminish the importance of DIA to its Defense customers. DIA consistently plays three key roles in the Defense intelligence process: as an all- source analytical and production capability providing products tailored to Defense officials' needs and in support of military operations; as part of the larger IC competitive analyses; and management of Defense intelligence production so as to reduce unnecessary duplication. DIA's significant all-source role argues strongly that it, like CIA, should include second- and third-tier exploiters of the various collection disciplines. RECOMMENDATION: The DIA's role as the focal point for management of Defense all-source analysis and production should be reinforced. (No legislative change.) DIA should also house second- and third-tier exploiters of the various collection disciplines. Nor should this role for the CIA diminish the role played by other departmental intelligence entities for their specific consumers. They are also necessary to the concept of competitive analysis, which we believe is useful to decision-makers throughout the government. Moreover, each of these offices also contributes to IC-wide analyses, such as National Intelligence Estimates. RECOMMENDATION: State/INR, Energy's Intelligence Office and the Treasury's Intelligence Office should continue to be the primary analytical producers for their departmental consumers. (No legislative change.) Community Collection. Many people, when they think about intelligence, think about spies or perhaps satellites -- collection. Collection by a variety of secret methods is, in large measure, what sets the IC apart from other information sources -- either within the government or in the private sector. A. Clandestine Service. Clandestine activities are what most people think about when they hear the word "intelligence:" Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collectors (spies) and people carrying out covert action. These capabilities are housed primarily, but not exclusively, in the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO). This aspect of the IC remains the most controversial, the most charged politically, and frequently a major area of contention in congressional oversight. We did not, as part of IC21, take up the issue of the propriety of these activities. There will be a continuing need for HUMINT, as a major means of getting access to plans and intentions. Similarly, we cannot see any reason to forswear the ability to undertake covert actions completely. This capability remains necessary and -- when used properly within the context of well-defined policy and operational goals, executed by legally responsible officials and with due executive and congressional oversight -- it remains important. FINDING: The U.S. will continue to need the capabilities to collect HUMINT, especially as a major insight into intentions and plans of hostile states or groups, and to carry out covert action. These are difficult tasks and should only be undertaken by individuals who not only have the unique abilities required, but who adhere to the highest professional standards and all legal requirements. FINDING: The U.S. requires a Clandestine Service of the highest professional standards and competence. Clandestine collection entails many more risks than the technical collection disciplines. Therefore, how and when it is used must be highly selective, responding to carefully screened and highest priority requirements. FINDING: Clandestine collection must be focused principally on select, high priority national and military requirements. Clandestine collection is also a difficult capability to use. It cannot be kept "on the shelf" and called out whenever needed. There must be some minimal ongoing capability that can be expanded in response to consumer needs. This has become increasingly difficult for the DO as the State Department, in response to budget stringencies, has scaled back its posts overseas, which provide the main base for clandestine collection. Former DCI Woolsey noted that U.S. intelligence was going from "global presence" to "global reach." This scaled back status makes it much more difficult for clandestine services to respond to unanticipated collection requirements. FINDING: It is necessary to have at least a minimal clandestine presence in most countries (a "global presence") so as to maintain a broader base-line contingency capability and to respond to transnational collection requirements. Having accepted the necessity for maintaining and, on occasion, using covert action, we also recognize that these operations require the most careful management, expertise and coordination. As one witness at an IC21 staff panel observed, these are the operations that inevitably land the DCI in trouble. This tendency can be minimized if careful attention is paid to the command and control of clandestine operations. FINDING: Clandestine operations require an extraordinarily high level of management attention, expertise and coordination. Under the current arrangement, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) is three layers removed from the DCI, having between them the Executive Director of the CIA and the DDCI. Even though the DDO can, presumably, see the DCI whenever necessary, this distancing is too great. The observation about the DO being the place that most often lands the DCI in trouble rings very true. It should be made into a separate service and brought under the DCI's direct control. This single Clandestine Service (CS) should include those components of the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) that undertake clandestine collection as well. We do not believe that this division is of utility in terms of collection. We are especially concerned that the Defense Department is unlikely to give DHS the kind of authorities, attention, resources and career development incentives that it will need to become a truly capable clandestine human collection enterprise. Just as intelligence struggled for years to be recognized as a career speciality within the armed forces, DHS faces the same challenge. FINDING: The Defense Department is unlikely to give DHS the kind of attention, resources and career development incentives that it will need to become a truly capable clandestine human collection enterprise. We believe that these two entities should be consolidated into one CS under the operational control of the DCI. This is not meant to preclude the Service Intelligence Chiefs from carrying out those clandestine collection activities specifically related to the tactical needs of their Military Departmental customers or field commanders. RECOMMENDATION: The Clandestine Service will be responsible for all clandestine human collection (current CIA/DO and DHS) and shall be under the direct control of the DCI. The unique activities of the CS are such that it cannot be managed within the IC as simply another collection discipline. It is the only arm of the U.S. government that has as a principal mission the breaking of foreign laws, something it does on a daily basis around the world in the face of concerted counterintelligence efforts by hostile foreign governments. Managing the CS is markedly different that managing satellite-borne reconnaissance systems or listening posts on U.S. soil. Moreover, the CS is more than an intelligence collection entity. As several former DCIs have pointed out, the clandestine services are also the DCI's most important "action arm," not only running covert action programs at the direction of the President (a function whose utility we believe will continue to be important), but also in managing most the IC's liaison with foreign government leaders and security services. Each former DCI agreed that these activities demand the DCI's close executive control. Finally, history has shown that the DCI cannot avoid responsibility for being informed about and overseeing the activities of clandestine services. Accordingly, he must avoid any management structure that attenuates his command and control of the CS. FINDING: The mission and management of the Clandestine Service are unique and demand direct accountability to, and control by, the DCI. Given the political and administrative problems raised by clandestine operations and covert action, their bureaucratic tie to the DCI must be made more direct. At present as many as two or three officials are between the DCI and the CIA's DO. Moreover, there are no compelling substantive reasons for the DO to be part of the same agency as the analytic Directorate of Intelligence (DI). This is largely the product of historical accident and the bureaucratic aggressiveness of DCI Walter Bedell Smith, who expanded CIA activities into both operations and analysis in the early 1950s, when other agencies failed to meet policy-maker needs in these areas. Indeed, there is a certain "apples and oranges" aspect to attempting to manage both of these functions within one agency. FINDING: The current arrangement of housing analysis and operations in one agency is the result of historical accident rather than well-thought needs. It complicates the management of both activities. We believe that having the CS as a distinct entity, under the direct control of the DCI, would rationalize the structure of the CIA as the premier all-source analytical agency and reinforce the unique and highly valuable contributions of clandestine operators. The CS and the CIA can continue to be housed in the same building. However, both the CS and the CIA could also be managed more effectively if they each had one major task. RECOMMENDATION: The Clandestine Service is to be separate from CIA, reporting directly to the DCI. Clandestine collection and covert action is not a place for amateurs. The CS should be managed by a director chosen by the DCI from among the ranks of career intelligence professionals. However, this is not meant to limit the choice only to those who have served in the CS. In a more corporate IC, there will be senior managers who are not career CS employees but whose managerial skills and breadth of experience may make them suitable candidates to be the Director of the CS. After much debate, we recommend that this individual not be subject to confirmation by the Senate. The sensitivity of this position is such that the DCI must be free to choose the man or woman upon whom the utmost reliance can be placed. Senate confirmation raises a number of other political considerations that might best be avoided. RECOMMENDATION: The Director of Clandestine Services is to be selected by the DCI from among intelligence professionals. We recognize that the CS undertakes some activities specifically designed to support military operations. Indeed, there has been a growing emphasis on this since the Gulf War. This is an important activity and should not be curtailed. Nor is that the implication of the creation of a single CS, including elements of DHS. In order to assure that there is someone within the CS who is responsible for and extremely knowledgeable about such operations, there should be a Deputy Director of two-star rank for these activities. RECOMMENDATION: There will be a Deputy Director of the Clandestine Service, who is a two-star professional military intelligence officer, responsible for coordination between the Clandestine Service and the various military and Defense components. The CS should continue to be seen, however, as an IC asset. HUMINT is and should be part of a larger IC-wide collection plan. Thus, the CS should be responsive to and tasked by the IC-wide collection management process under the DDCI/CM. RECOMMENDATION: For intelligence collection tasking and requirements purposes, the Clandestine Service should respond to the IC-wide collection management process. Under current arrangements, the DO receives necessary technical support from offices within the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T). These offices should be made organic to the CS, as should its administrative support offices. The remaining DS&T offices would come under the new Technology Development Office or new Technical Collection Agency, both of which are discussed below. RECOMMENDATION: The Clandestine Service should have organic administrative and technical support mechanisms that are critical to its unique functions and essential to its success. B. Technical Collection Agency. The most common criticism of the current collection management process, and one in which we concur, is that it is dominated by "stovepipes," i.e., types of collection that are managed so as to be largely distinct from one another. There are several net results. First, the collection disciplines become competitors for resources driven as much by bureaucratic imperatives as by a broader national need. Second, it also becomes much more difficult to make educated IC-wide decisions about overall collection needs and the resources required to implement them. Breaking down the "stovepipes" was one of the more frequently heard suggestions during the IC21 process. Remarkably, the current trend within the IC seems to be one that would reinforce the stovepipe approach, further compounding problems for little or no perceived gain. FINDING: The collection management process at the IC-wide level does not routinely integrate the discipline stovepipes. The stovepipe system also has a direct effect on analysis. Ideally, there should be some sort of synergy among the various types of collection. A HUMINT report should lead to an image as a means of confirmation; an intercepted signal should confirm a HUMINT report, etc. Instead, there are added difficulties in terms of analysts being able to use all types of intelligence on a routine basis. A system that should be highly synergistic is, instead, fragmented and internally competitive. This will become increasingly important as the complexity of national security concerns grows. Transnational issues are proving to be more difficult to address than the bipolar rivalry of the Cold War. Few issues appear to have the luxury of time in which to be addressed and resolved. A greater emphasis on all-source collection management appears to be a strong necessity. FINDING: There is still very little collection synergy among the intelligence collection stovepipes. As national security requirements become increasingly complex and demanding (transnational issues, short timelines), all-source collection management will be critical to future success. Production is, to some degree, taken as a given. Within production the lines as to what constitutes analysis is becoming increasingly blurred. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) analysts do analysis: they analyze signals and images for contents and meaning. Much of their work is an internal IC function, often (although not always) destined to go from one analyst to another. But this is different than "all-source" analysis, the synthesizing of all available intelligence into a finished product, more clearly destined to go to a civil or military policy-maker. There is a great need to sort out these roles and give them clearer meaning within the IC and in relationship to one another. FINDING: There is little IC attention given to production management. The line between SIGINT and IMINT analysis and reporting and all-source analysis and reporting is becoming increasingly blurred. In order to break down the collection stovepipes it is necessary to increase responsibility at the DCI level. If the various types of collection are not managed more coherently across the board, current problems will compound and efforts to achieve collection synergy and to improve all-source analysis will erode further. Such an approach is inherent in dealing with the IC as a more corporate entity. This should come under the DCI, with day-to-day responsibility falling to the DDCI/CM. RECOMMENDATION: Under the DDCI for Community Management, create an IC-wide management organization responsible for directing all collection tasking (HUMINT and technical) to the appropriate agencies and ensuring a coherent, multi-INT approach to all collection issues. Similarly, the three technical collection activities (SIGINT, IMINT and Measurement and Signatures Intelligence -- MASINT) should stop being separate and competing agencies. They represent parts of a larger whole and should be managed as such. The link between the analysts who first receive information from the technical collection activities and the all-source analysts is crucial. However, there are other "exploiters" who can be housed directly with the all-source analysts. This would improve the synergy between collection and analysis, improve the all-source nature of analysis, and clarify blurring between different types of analysis and reporting. This can be done without putting at risk the unique services they perform for the military during time of war. Maintaining the designation of a "combat support agency," which currently applies to NSA, is appropriate. RECOMMENDATION: Consolidate technical collection activities (SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT) and first-tier exploitation into a single agency -- the Technical Collection Agency (TCA). RECOMMENDATION: The TCA will be designated a Type-3 Combat Support Agency. RECOMMENDATION: The Director of TCA will be either a senior defense or intelligence civilian or three-star general officer. C. Technology Development Office. The IC has gone from being a leader in all aspects of technology crucial to its work, to being a leader in just a few -- primarily the technical collection systems but not the various types of data processing systems used to support them and other intelligence activities. As with all else in the IC, budget pressures are forcing rather difficult choices on managers across the entire range of activities. These pressures often lead managers to worry more about answering the immediate needs than to plan for the future. Research and development (R&D) funding is a victim of this mentality, as the immediate effects of deferring R&D are neither seen nor felt. However, given the strong dependence that the IC has on technology, this is an extremely short-sighted view. Several issues are at stake, among them: the ability of the IC to continue to be responsive to policy maker needs, especially in a world that is more politically complex and therefore requires a more flexible collection and processing base; rapid changes in information technology that offer the near-term possibility of increased production and increased synergy at decreased costs; and a necessary means of dealing with burgeoning sources of information, including an explosion of available open sources. At the same time, the stovepipe mentality of the IC has also led to a situation in which there is duplication and increased costs that could easily be avoided. Commonality in items now as basic as data processing remain the exception rather than the rule. The net result of these trends is an IC that has gone from being a leader to one that looks increasingly antiquated. FINDING: Tight budgets have squeezed R&D funding. The IC must manage R&D funding to ensure that the highest priority issues -- especially those requiring long lead times -- are being addressed and that there is no unnecessary duplication. There is unwarranted duplication in the IC's acquisition system for reconnaissance capabilities. The current system creates competition that exists more for bureaucratic reasons than for any developmental advantages. A merger of these responsibilities would also be a major gain. FINDING: The IC's current system for acquiring reconnaissance capabilities has unwarranted duplication, creating competition for bureaucratic rather than developmental reasons. RECOMMENDATION: Create an intelligence acquisition agency to perform community research and development functions, called the Technology Development Office (TDO). TDO will comprise portions of the current NRO, Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO), CIA/DS&T, et al. Some argue that such an organization will undercut the main strength of the NRO, its cradle-to-grave management of overhead systems. We believe that this view overstates the NRO's role, which is direct in terms of R&D and acquisition, but indirect in terms of the actual operation of these systems, which are carried out by contractors. We wish to emphasize the NRO's direct strengths. National Intelligence Evaluation Council. The IC has not been very capable in terms of being able to evaluate its own intelligence process from end-to-end. This is, admittedly, a difficult task, in part because there seems to be little respite in which to do it. It is also difficult because there are few useful guidelines for assessing production. Customer surveys, although constantly used, are rather pointless. Self-assessment is, at best, difficult. IC managers are constantly hard put to answer: "What is the value added of intelligence to the policy process?" The fact that the question is asked at all is troublesome. The fact that it cannot be answered is worse. This type of evaluation is an extremely important task. Without being able to assess whether or not tasking and collection respond to policy-maker requirements, whether analysis is making the best use of resources, the IC process becomes rather pointless. It appears to move more on inertia rather than on need. Being able to do better is now even more important as resources either remain stable or shrink. Without a better feel for the weak points and strong points across the entire IC process, all parts will likely suffer, as will the contribution of intelligence to policy making. FINDING: The IC needs to improve its ability to evaluate the intelligence process from end-to end, i.e., to be better able to relate requirements, tasking, collection and production. The IC already has an office charged with evaluations, as part of the National Intelligence Council (NIC). This appears to be the logical group to charge with the broader types of evaluation responsibilities noted above. Consonant with its new mandate, this staff should be separated from the NIC and made a National Intelligence Evaluation Council (NIEC) in its own right. The remaining part of the NIC, i.e., the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), would become part of the new CIA, as noted above. The head of this new council would be appointed by the DCI, as is the current head of the NIC, and would report directly to the DCI, so that the DCI can readily oversee and assess the entire intelligence process. RECOMMENDATION: Establish a National Intelligence Evaluation Council (NIEC) to evaluate IC-wide collection and production, and to interact closely with the requirements, collection management and resource management functions of the CMS. RECOMMENDATION: The head of the NIEC will be appointed by and report directly to the DCI. Civilian Intelligence Reserve Program. The ability to "surge" analytical resources and to capitalize on expertise residing outside of the IC will be key to the effectiveness of the IC as it enters the 21st Century. No requirements process can predict all of the issues that are likely to be of paramount interest to policy-makers in the course of any year. Surveys are, by and large, not useful to policy-makers. As Lt. General Brent Scowcroft observed, senior policy makers do not know what they need from the IC until they need it. In a national security environment where there is not one predominant focus, as was the case during the Cold War, flexibility becomes a central necessity for the IC. As one of our witnesses, Ambassador Robert Kimmitt, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, has stated, the IC will have to be an inch deep and a mile wide, with the ability to go a mile deep on any given issue. To do this, the IC must maintain some level of knowledge on all nations/issues at some level of detail -- an intelligence "base." FINDING: The IC must be able to "surge." As Ambassador Robert Kimmitt put it succinctly, IC coverage must be an inch deep and a mile wide, with the ability to go a mile deep on any given issue. FINDING: The IC will be required to maintain some level of knowledge on all nations/issues at some level of detail -- an intelligence "base." The capability to support this base or to "go a mile deep" need not be self-contained within the IC. The CIA already has in place procedures enabling it to increase its capabilities, using former employees on a temporary basis. This capability should be augmented into an IC civilian reserve program, in which experts not in the IC (in academia, business, etc.) can be kept on retainer both to provide ongoing information on warning and trends and to be utilized during crises to augment IC assets. Such a program has several advantages. First, it allows the IC to concentrate on the current areas of highest priority and concern while knowing that someone who is attuned to IC needs is also keeping an eye on areas that are quiescent. Second, the ability to bring in experts who understand local politics and players in a region is especially important during the early phase of a crisis, when the IC is often scrambling to come up to speed. Many of these experts can be kept on retainer and be asked to do unclassified work, that, in effect, will provide the IC with more knowledgeable access to the open sources. If the "reservists" are asked to work within the IC for extended periods, then some thought has to be given to the issue of clearances and polygraph requirements. A flexible approach to these issues would best serve the overall interests of the IC and the nation. There are many ways a civilian reserve program could be run. To be successful, however, such a program would probably have to be developed and managed at the Community level, so as to properly address administrative concerns (security, pay, etc.) as well as substantive concerns -- assuring that duplicative expertise is minimized and agencies do not compete for resources to support individual reserve programs. Some developmental work on a reserve program is being done at this time in the NIC. This work should continue and a pilot program should be enacted in the near term. RECOMMENDATION: An IC-wide civilian reserve program should be established, whose participants can provide ongoing trends and warning information and can be utilized to "surge" as part of the IC, thus augmenting existing IC assets, especially during crises. Congressional Oversight. IC21 also examined the way in which Congress handles its oversight responsibilities for intelligence. Although these findings and recommendations would not require formal legislation, they would require changes in the rules of the House. The current oversight system is 20 years old, a direct product of major congressional and executive branch investigations that revealed a number of shortcomings in both how the IC functioned and in how Congress pursued intelligence oversight. This is important to note as it helped foster the view that intelligence and intelligence oversight were in some ways extraordinary issues, to be handled in amanner different from other government functions. Not surprisingly, we believe that the current oversight system has responded well to these concerns. FINDING: The current Congressional oversight system is a product of extraordinary disclosures of the 1970s and their sequels. It has responded well to the concerns that fostered it. Having said that, we are also aware that this continuing view of intelligence as something extraordinary also puts pressures on intelligence oversight that are unique. All oversight is a mixture of two roles: investigator and advocate. Being an advocate for intelligence may be more difficult than for other government functions not only because of the secrecy that is involved, which limits what can be said, but also because of the ongoing suspicion about intelligence agencies and activities in some quarters. Several former DCIs pointed out that intelligence, unlike other federal programs, has no natural constituency. Therefore, if Congress is not prepared to act as an advocate when that role is proper and necessary, no one else will. This aspect of oversight is especially important if the IC and its necessary activities are to enjoy even a minimal amount of public support. FINDING: Oversight embodies two roles: investigator and advocate. HPSCI advocacy for the IC is essential but difficult given the secret nature of intelligence. Intelligence, unlike other federal programs, has no natural constituency; therefore, Congress plays a vital role in building public support. As with all oversight, there is an inherent tension between the amount and type of intelligence information that Congress believes it needs and what the Executive is willing to provide. In the case of intelligence, this is exacerbated by the perception that Congress is the major source of leaks. FINDING: Existing oversight identifies and continues to address problems within the IC. Inherent tensions between executive and legislative branches cause resistance to the free flow of information to the Congress. This is exacerbated by the perception that Congress is the major source of leaks of classified information. A joint committee on intelligence has been suggested as one remedy. We do not believe that it would substantially reduce the number of Members and staff with access to classified information. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees also do not pursue identical agendas. Given the breadth and diversity of the IC, this two committee oversight structure is a strength, as it broadens oversight. A joint committee would reduce the effectiveness of the current checks and balances. Finally, it would continue to underscore the view that intelligence is so different that it must be handled in an extraordinary manner. FINDING: A joint intelligence committee would not improve the quality of oversight and would erode existing legislative checks and balances. It would reinforce the perception that intelligence oversight is different and that intelligence programs require different levels of scrutiny. Dealing with the intelligence budget raises some problems. As the IC budget is classified -- both the overall figure and virtually all of the component parts -- it is masked by being made part of the defense budget. Intelligence, in the House is authorized separately, and then appended to the defense authorization. Should that budget become subject to reductions, the intelligence budget often has to give its "fair share," not for reasons inherent to the value of intelligence programs, but largely because of this budget mechanism. This puts intelligence at a disadvantage. Within the appropriations process, intelligence is dealt with in the National Security Subcommittee. This also can result in intelligence being dealt with as an appendage of defense issues rather than as a separate government function. This process also results in a confused Congressional message on intelligence because of the variety of reasons for which budget decisions may be made. FINDING: The current Congressional budget process puts intelligence programs at a disadvantage, making them subject to arbitrary cuts because the intelligence budget is subordinated to the defense budget. FINDING: The current budget process can also result in a confused Congressional message to the IC. A major facet of the way in which the current intelligence oversight system was created is the requirement that tenure on HPSCI be limited. This rule was adopted because it was felt that past Congressional overseers had become too close to the IC agencies over prolonged periods of time and had lost a certain critical objective edge. Twenty years later, the costs of such a system are also apparent: a rapid turnover in membership and in some senior staff, diluting the capabilities of the Committee. There have been six chairmen of HPSCI over the last six Congresses. The oversight system is now sufficiently mature to allow, at a minimum, an extension of the tenure rules and serious consideration of ending tenure limits. Similarly, thought should be given to changing the Committee from a select committee to a standing committee. Again, this raises important questions, including the degree to which this will be an attractive assignment; the continued utility of having "cross-over" Members, particularly from Appropriations; and whether it is better to have the Speaker make appointments to the Committee or leave it to the majority caucus. RECOMMENDATION: The House should give serious consideration to either extending or removing tenure limits on HPSCI. RECOMMENDATION: The House should consider making HPSCI a standing committee, with appointments still made by the Speaker. VI. Findings and Recommendations: Non-Legislative As noted above, the IC21 staff studies made numerous findings and recommendations that would not require legislative action. We believe that these will also support the findings and recommendations made above, improving the overall performance of the IC. They are listed here with brief introductions as to the nature of the issues being addressed. Broader and more detailed discussions can be found in the staff studies themselves. Intelligence Community Management: Production. Production is, in effect, the end of the intelligence pipeline. It is what the policy makers see, a product (usually written), drawn from the various pieces of collected intelligence and leavened by the analyst's own knowledge and experience. We must face the fact that analytical resources are unlikely to grow substantially. Although the decline of the past several years in intelligence budgets was halted in 1995, there is no guarantee that this is much more than temporary relief. Moreover, it is not likely that there will be large increases in intelligence spending over the next several years. Therefore, the IC needs to manage smarter, finding new ways to do more with less. Ongoing rapid technological change in information management may offer new possibilities and advantages. The ability to move information, including intelligence, between and among disparate and widely-separated work stations could increase synergy above the actual number of current analysts. Linking analysts of all sorts in this manner may also be helpful, in effect creating a "virtual analytical environment." FINDING: Analytical resources are unlikely to grow substantially. Increased and more synergistic productivity may be possible through the use of a "virtual analytical environment." RECOMMENDATION: Create a "virtual analytical environment" within the IC that electronically links collectors, exploiters, analysts and customers, as appropriate, and maximizes the productivity and responsiveness of individual analysts. Intelligence Community Management: Programming and Budgeting. We envision that the DCI will execute most of his authority over the NFIP (and the broader IC budget) through the CMS, under the DDCI/CM. It is essential that this staff have both program analysis and evaluation capability and comptroller capability if these responsibilities are to be carried out effectively. These capabilities will also be meaningless unless there is also the authority to withhold funds. RECOMMENDATION: The CMS should have a program analysis and evaluation (PA&E) capability and a comptroller capability, with the authority to withhold funds. Understanding or managing the IC is complicated by its rather rigid and stratified budget structure. Each asset, activity or program is allotted to one and only one IC responsibility. This makes it very difficult to achieve synergies from collection systems, processing and even analysis. It also tends to skew the IC budget, giving even greater emphasis than is the actual case to defense-related activities, which of necessity remain dominant. It is important to understand that most IC assets and activities fall into multiple categories and should be tracked accordingly. This would create a capability that is currently lacking: being able to ascertain rapidly and with some assurance of accuracy what part of IC resources is devoted to specific issues, such as non-proliferation, East Asia, etc. RECOMMENDATION: An IC programming, budgeting and accounting system must be developed that allows the IC to build budgets and track expenditures in multiple categories. Intelligence Community Management: Personnel. To repeat, people are the key element of the IC. All of the collection capabilities are meaningless machines unless there are dedicated people behind them -- building them, operating them, processing the data, analyzing it. We find that the vast majority of people who work in the IC are extremely dedicated to their work and to its value to our national security. The system within which they work, however, is not designed to get the very best out of them in terms of either bureaucratic rules or the type of leadership (rather than management) that breeds elan. Curiously, the IC tends to manage personnel much like it manages collection, through an array of "stovepipes" that are bundled together but are not well inter-connected. It is very difficult for either managers or analysts themselves to move about within the IC. FINDING: In order to create a more corporate culture and reduce the stranglehold of stovepipes, the barriers to lateral movement within the IC need to be broken down. FINDING: The IC requires personnel reform to enable it to change its skill mix and to streamline its workforce in an era of reduced government spending. FINDING: Improving the personnel system will improve morale, public relations and accountability. RECOMMENDATION: Implement the recommendations of the Jehn Report. RECOMMENDATION: Standardize the SES system within the IC, and strongly encourage rotational assignments as a prerequisite for SES rank. Include rotations to industry as part of the IC rotation system. RECOMMENDATION: Introduce legislation, coordinated with OMB, to authorize a pilot program to reduce the number of IC personnel further, to include lifting of the 2% waiver and directed retirement of retirement-eligible personnel. Intelligence Community Management: Research and Development. Under the corporate concept we advocate, the DCI should be responsible for adapting advanced technology to IC needs on short notice. At two different full Committee hearings we were struck by expert testimony decrying the inability of the government to move quickly to purchase technology on a timely basis. The DCI needs a better mechanism to find short-cuts in this process. FINDING: The DCI needs a mechanism to fund good technology ideas on short notice. Venture capital concepts should be part of this process. A glaring example of current IC problems is information systems. There is a veritable plethora of systems, standards and acquisition processes. If we are going to move towards an IC that has greater inter-operability among its disparate parts, and tries to achieve "virtual analytical communities" tied together electronically, then a common system is a bedrock requirement. FINDING: The IC needs greater standardization of information systems, including acquisition by a single organization. There also needs to be a budgetary mechanism to recapitalize these systems cyclically to keep everyone interoperable and up-to-date. RECOMMENDATION: Centralize planning and budgeting for IC R&D, to include administration of the National Technical Alliance with the National Imagery Display Lab and the National Media Lab. RECOMMENDATION: Establish a Military Exploitation of Reconnaissance and Intelligence Technology (MERIT)-like program for the IC to fund "good ideas" and to exploit technological targets of opportunity. The DCI should also use his Contingency Reserve Fund for such opportunities. RECOMMENDATION: Centralize development of standards and protocols for the IC. Establish a budgetary mechanism for rapid and continuous update of information systems and automation technologies. Intelligence Community Requirements. Intelligence is a service. Its entire raison d'etre is to provide a product to or undertake operations for other parts of the government. Unless the IC is responding to policy maker requirements, it simply is not doing its job. Requirements are the prime cause of all other IC activities: they drive collection, tasking, analysis and determine the allocation of resources throughout these processes. Getting control of requirements is fundamental and urgent. The requirements process has traditionally been one of the most vexing aspects of intelligence management. Ideally, intelligence producers would like to have guidance from the highest policy makers possible. The interagency process, which includes the IC, informs the IC as to policy maker concerns. Over the years the process has been haphazard and imperfect. The world of the late-20th and early-21st centuries presents new stresses for the requirements process. A Cold War-based IC had the comfort of knowing that its major emphasis was the struggle with the Soviet Union and all that this entailed. The absence of this overwhelming requirement has resulted in a growing tangle of new requirements, none of which has the same lasting primacy. Issues are the "highest priority" for rather short periods of time. At the same time, the resources available to the IC to deal with current and new requirements continue to decline. The need for a better requirements system is clear. FINDING: The IC needs an overarching concept for coordinating intelligence requirements, especially when faced with declining resources, a growing customer base, and increasingly diverse requirements. FINDING: The IC needs a corporate understanding of its collection and production capabilities and how it uses these resources to meet intelligence requirements. The IC also needs a strategic vision outlining what resources will be needed in the 21st century to fulfill likely intelligence requirements. FINDING: Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD-35) has focused the IC on important near-term, high priority requirements. However, PDD-35 has begun to drive intelligence collection and production at the expense of lower "tier" issues. FINDING: The IC's ability to maintain an intelligence "base" on many lower tier issues is threatened not only because of PDD-35's unintentional effect on collection and production, but also because the IC currently has no mechanism to ensure a basic level of coverage on "lower tier" countries. RECOMMENDATION: The IC should fulfill PDD-35 requirements, but also maintain the capability to have a basic level of worldwide coverage. RECOMMENDATION: The DCI should direct the CMS to devise a strategic plan, which should be updated yearly if necessary, outlining national security issues and gaps that the IC will likely face 10 to 15 years into the future. RECOMMENDATION: The National Intelligence Evaluation Council (NIEC) should be responsible for the Comprehensive Capabilities Review. The review should be updated continuously, taking the DCI's strategic plan into account, to assess the IC's worldwide collection/analytical capabilities and gaps against all tier issues. RECOMMENDATION: The IC should implement a "virtual analytic environment" to link collectors, exploiters, analysts and customers electronically, as appropriate, to improve the IC's responsiveness to customer needs. DIA's test-bed plan, JIVA (Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture), is a useful place to start. RECOMMENDATION: Intelligence managers should function less as intermediaries who control the information flow to and from policy-makers and more as facilitators who ensure that valid requirements are fulfilled with appropriate resources. Managers should also ensure that intelligence does not become politicized as a result of the close policy-maker/analyst working relationship. Collection Synergy. Once requirements have been established, the next major decision is the allocation of resources to meet these requirements, especially the resources required to collect needed intelligence. No other nation has collection capabilities comparable to those of the United States. In terms of breadth and depth, the United States has enjoyed a vast superiority as the result of major investments and a great deal of hard work. Intelligence experts speak to one another about collection disciplines, i.e., the basic groups into which collection fall: SIGINT: signals intelligence; IMINT: imagery; MASINT: measurement and signature intelligence; HUMINT: human intelligence; and, most recently, OSINT: open sources. These five groups have not developed evenly and are not managed in similar manners. Ideally, they should provide an array of information, allowing analysts to confirm intelligence gleaned from one discipline by comparing it with that gathered from others -- creating a true synergy. Each discipline has particular strengths and weaknesses, working better or worse than others against particular intelligence problems. Together, it is hoped that they will minimize uncertainty and amplify that which is known. As managed today, there are impediments towards achieving this synergy. Among the most obvious is the problem of stovepipes, the fact that each discipline is managed with a great deal of independence from the others. As noted above, rather than being allies, they become competitors, especially when intelligence budgets are being developed. This internecine competition undercuts much of the hoped-for synergy and can become increasingly debilitating. FINDING: The U.S. has derived tremendous benefit from a balance and interaction among the three technical intelligence disciplines (SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT), HUMINT and open sources. However, the IC has not managed collection consistently across the various INTs, thereby decreasing efficiency and productivity. FINDING: This benefit could erode unless greater attention is given to closer central management and coordination among all INTs. FINDING: Recent international and political changes and technological advances have greatly increased the quality and quantity of open source information. FINDING: "All-source" analytical skills are central to future intelligence capabilities and need increased emphasis. RECOMMENDATION: A CMS with IC-wide authority over, and coordination of, requirements, resources and collection would greatly aid collection synergy. RECOMMENDATION: To the extent possible, there should be common standards and protocols for technical collection systems, from collection through processing, exploitation and dissemination. RECOMMENDATION: The IC must continue to develop improved means of collecting, exploiting and processing open source information. There must be a concerted effort to educate intelligence producers and consumers regarding the utility of open source information. RECOMMENDATION: The IC must improve its ability to retrieve data from common databases. These databases must be checked thoroughly by those responsible for requirements and analysis before new collection tasks are levied. Collection should be guided by the use of the least costly, most efficient and most productive means, whether overt or covert. Collection: Launch. Spaceborne technical collection systems are useless unless there are adequate means of putting them into orbit. It is a truism, worth repeating, that launch vehicles must be considered a critical part of our overall intelligence collection architecture. FINDING: Launch vehicles will remain a critical component of the U.S. intelligence collection architecture. FINDING: The U.S. needs simple, reliable, affordable launch vehicles. The Titan-IV launch vehicle is not the best means of ensuring a viable 21st century collection architecture. Other options -- such as new launch vehicles and changes in satellite design -- must be pursued. FINDING: Current launch vehicles are becoming prohibitively expensive. RECOMMENDATION: If technically feasible, all IC payloads should be taken off the Titan-IV. No Titan-IVs should be purchased by the IC after the 1997 buy, and even that should be reconsidered. RECOMMENDATION: The U.S. should examine the viability of advanced technologies to reduce the size of satellites. RECOMMENDATION: The Air Force should modify its Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program to focus solely on the heavy lift problem. The U.S. government should take advantage of the Medium Launch Vehicle (MLV) competition between McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin in order to keep MLV costs low. RECOMMENDATION: All IC payloads, during their current redesign phase, should incorporate the "ship and shoot" approach (i.e., payloads arrive at the launch site ready for launch, with no on-site assembly, testing, etc.). RECOMMENDATION: All IC payloads, during the current redesign phase, should conform to the standard interface of the launch vehicle. NRO MLV class payloads should be compatible with both the Atlas IIAS/R and the Delta 3. Technical Collection: SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT. Detailed discussions of these collection disciplines and plans for future capabilities are, of course, highly classified. However, there are broad points at issue that can be discussed on an unclassified basis. SIGINT. SIGINT is an extremely valuable capability, allowing the observation of activity through the content and pattern of signals and giving insights into intentions. It is responsive to a large number of the issues with which the IC is now dealing and will continue to do so into the foreseeable future. FINDING: SIGINT provides a valuable capability both to observe activity and to gauge intentions. It will continue to be a critical element of the IC for the foreseeable future. FINDING: The SIGINT system performs well, but is at a crossroads. The proliferation of digital communications, fiber optic cable, sophisticated encryption and signalling techniques are major technical challenges, both for collection and processing. Growth in one telecommunications medium does not detract from the others; all types of communications are increasing. The ability to intercept all of these media is important for several reasons: different types of information use different communications media; pieces of the same message may travel different routes; multi-source collection makes deception by current or potential adversaries more difficult. FINDING: SIGINT is already the most expensive of the collection disciplines. Balancing the required level of investment in technology with the maintenance of existing core capabilities is the true challenge for SIGINT in the 21st century. RECOMMENDATION: Improve the management and focus of SIGINT R&D to ensure that critical areas are adequately funded. RECOMMENDATION: Mandate a review of the overall Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) architecture and the mix of available collection platforms. RECOMMENDATION: Examine the feasibility of smaller platforms to reduce the cost of certain collection. RECOMMENDATION: Continue to press for a unifying policy on Information Warfare (IW) from the Administration. Clarify the management and direction of offensive IW activities in peacetime and in support of military operations. RECOMMENDATION: Reduce numbers of different airborne SIGINT platforms while increasing overall numbers of aircraft; develop and implement a common ground processing architecture for airborne SIGINT operations. Develop SIGINT payloads for use on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). IMINT. The utility of imagery will continue both for those issues with which it is most often associated -- indications and warning, and military operations -- but also for many of the transnational issues that appear to be increasingly important in the late 20th century. FINDING: IMINT will continue to be an important collection discipline for a wide variety of issues: indications and warning; support to the military; and monitoring arms control agreements, refugee flows, narcotics cultivation and ecological problems. FINDING: Given present trends, the number of images collected will continue to outpace our ability to analyze them. FINDING: Collection costs continue to rise at the expense of processing and exploitation. FINDING: Imagery analysts are working with archaic tools; the current acquisition process does not facilitate the timely infusion of new technology. FINDING: The imagery community is badly fragmented. Any restructuring should be considered only within the wider context of all other intelligence functions and activities. FINDING: "Denial and deception" activities by foreign governments are a current problem. As U.S. imagery capabilities become more widely known, this problem will likely grow. FINDING: The IC can use commercial imagery more effectively to meet some requirements. FINDING: Imagery dissemination to the military below the Joint Task Force level remains a problem. FINDING: The imagery community is not currently able to satisfy the requirements for both immediate and detailed analysis. RECOMMENDATION: The IC must improve its acquisition and use of commercially-available imagery. Such imagery can be used in lieu of more costly national assets. As demands to share imagery with non-Allies during multilateral operations increase, the use of commercial imagery is especially important to obviate security concerns. RECOMMENDATION: Set up an account for the easy purchase of commercial imagery, done under common U.S. government licenses. A central repository and indexing system should be created for easy access by all users. RECOMMENDATION: The IC must move to all-digital exploitation of imagery, with access to cross-INT databases. Move to a "virtual analytic environment," i.e., one in which analysts are connected electronically. Increase funding to accelerate the procurement of softcopy (digital) workstations for imagery analysts. RECOMMENDATION: The IC should move aggressively to infuse new technologies, such as automatic target recognition capabilities, in order to help streamline the imagery exploitation process. RECOMMENDATION: Expand the purview of the National Technical Alliance, increasing its resources and flexibility to provide more rapid fielding of new technologies, and to exploit commercially available technology. RECOMMENDATION: The IC must continue to examine and to field means by which to overcome "denial and deception" activities. MASINT. MASINT -- measurement and signals intelligence -- is undoubtedly the least understood of the various collection disciplines. This is unfortunate, both for its own sake and because MASINT will continue to be an important source for military planners, during military operations, and for monitoring arms control and proliferation activities. FINDING: MASINT, as a specific and unique discipline, is not well understood by either the IC or policy consumers. Therefore, the potential of its future contributions, particularly to tactical applications, may be limited. FINDING: MASINT will become increasingly important in providing unique scientific or highly technical information contributions to the IC. It can provide specific weapon identifications, chemical compositions and material content and a potential adversary's capability to employ weapons. FINDING: The Central MASINT Office (CMO) has the requisite legal authorities to carry out its responsibility of managing MASINT. However, it is not staffed commensurate with its responsibilities, and a fractured organizational structure limits its overall management abilities. FINDING: MASINT is a science intensive discipline that needs personnel well-versed in the broad range of physical and electrical sciences. Such personnel cannot typically be professionally developed within the IC. They must come from academia fresh with the scientific knowledge from experimentation and research. Nor can they continue to be proficient in their areas of expertise if they are maintained in government employ for an entire career. RECOMMENDATION: The IC should create a U.S. MASINT System analogous to U.S. SIGINT and U.S. IMINT Systems (USSS and USIS). RECOMMENDATION: The MASINT manager should be a general officer or SES, and should be a member of the Military Intelligence Board, National Foreign Intelligence Board and other senior DCI and DOD boards and panels. His authorities to manage MASINT should be on par with those of the SIGINT and IMINT managers. RECOMMENDATION: Training is critical. The IC needs to increase emphasis on informing the IC and consumers about MASINT capabilities and products. Additionally, the IC needs to make MASINT a formal course of professional education for all IC school houses. RECOMMENDATION: The IC should examine the feasibility of pursuing trial personnel management programs that provide incentives to recruit the necessary scientific experts. Such experts may not spend a 20-30 year career in government employ. Clandestine Service. In addition to the legislative proposals for the CS described above, there are other management issues that need to be addressed. These include civilian and military personnel management, the CS's role in operations, and the management of operations overseas. RECOMMENDATION: The IC's personnel system should ensure the recruitment of highly qualified junior employees, the development of technical clandestine operators and managers, and the aggressive removal of marginal and unsuitable employees. RECOMMENDATION: The military cadre of the CS should consist of military clandestine operations officers having a viable military career track within that specialization and of the same high professional and personal qualifications as the civilian cadre. RECOMMENDATION: The DCI needs to reaffirm and reiterate throughout the IC his designation of the CS's role to lead the IC in its conduct of foreign "clandestine operations," i.e., espionage, counter-espionage, covert action and related intelligence liaison activities abroad. RECOMMENDATION: The CS's Chiefs of Station should act as the U.S. Government's on-site focal point for the deconfliction of all intelligence and law enforcement activities abroad, with an appeal process functioning through the Ambassador and/or a Washington-based interagency mechanism. RECOMMENDATION: The CS should have at least a minimal presence in most countries (a "global presence") so as to maintain a broader base-line contingency capability and to respond to transnational collection requirement. RECOMMENDATION: The management of clandestine operations requires an extraordinarily high level of management attention, operational expertise and coordination. Managerial and personnel assignments must be consistent with this fact. IC "Surge" Capability. Unpredictability is one of the facts of life of any intelligence system. No requirements process will be able to predict all of the issues that are likely to be of paramount interest to policy-makers in the course of any given year. Indeed, flexibility of all resources -- technical and personnel -- are necessary in order to respond quickly to new events. This problem of requirements and resources has been made increasingly difficult in the post-Cold War world. The end of the Cold War not only removed the single overwhelming focus of the IC, but also contributed to a breakdown of international order in specific regions, particularly the growth of ethnic warfare, and exacerbated a number of transnational issues. The ability of the IC to "surge" resources -- i.e., to focus collection and analysis, and sometimes operational capabilities -- on suddenly important areas, is of increasing importance. One of the witnesses at an IC21 hearing, Ambassador Robert Kimmitt, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, put it succinctly when he said that IC coverage must be an inch deep and a mile wide, with the ability to go a mile deep on any given issue. FINDING: The ability to meet future challenges effectively will require: increased internal operating efficiencies; a more collective, corporate approach toward utilization of resources; and structured programs that provide continuous force augmentation and "surge" capability. FINDING: A flexible, dynamic and well-planned surge capability must be developed that can be relied upon both day-to-day and during crises. RECOMMENDATION: Development of more flexible collection capabilities should not only include moving to smaller satellites, but also to developing and incorporating "tactical" satellites that would allow for a "surge" in collection capability for specific crises. RECOMMENDATION: The DCI's ability to establish IC Centers and Task Forces quickly (including the rapid transfer of personnel and resources throughout the IC) must be enhanced and should include the ability to bring "surge" resources into the IC from other areas. RECOMMENDATION: Better utilization of existing military reserve components is also required. Consideration should be given to placing some of these components under the DMI for better utilization during time of need. Support to Military Operations. Support to military operations (SMO) is one of the major roles of intelligence. Some argue that it is the major role of intelligence. The Clinton administration -- both policy makers and senior intelligence managers -- has stated that SMO is the top priority for intelligence. Critics question why this statement is necessary, given that much of the IC's effort has always been shaped around this specific intelligence role and that, in the post-Cold War world, U.S. national security is actually less threatened than at any time since 1940. This debate over SMO is important as it goes to the heart of both requirements and resources. Intelligence is not an easily expanded resource. As noted in the discussion on the IC's ability to surge, covering current requirements and taking steps to address unexpected ones is difficult at best. The more resources devoted to any one area, the fewer there are left to address others. The issue is not whether the IC should devote resources to SMO, but rather how much SMO is reasonable given other, competing demands on a fiscally constrained IC. SMO is, to some extent, a contingent need. At least through the Cold War, U.S. defense policy had been shaped around the idea of deterring combat, of using force as a last resort. Other, non-SMO, policy needs are current -- diplomacy, narcotics, terrorism, proliferation. Thus, a balance needs to be struck. Urging an increased emphasis on SMO without looking across the board at all IC requirements runs the risk of leaving many other ongoing policy needs partially or completely unfulfilled. FINDING: The current demands being placed on the IC to support military operations will make it difficult for the IC to meet the broader national security challenges of the 21st century. FINDING: Currently, SMO demands are being satisfied at the expense of maintaining the necessary intelligence"base" that will be critical to the IC in addressing future national security needs. FINDING: Maintaining both the "base" and SMO represent valid concerns. SMO requirements must not stand alone, apart from other intelligence requirements. FINDING: The IC must develop and maintain a balanced approach in satisfying these concerns. The IC must ensure that the "base" is maintained even during periods of crisis, when IC resources can easily be overwhelmed by all-consuming SMO requirements. FINDING: The new operational strategy, Dominant Battlefield Awareness, will require significant advances in technology, development of consolidated requirements, coherent tasking management and synergistic intelligence collection capabilities. It is necessary to give serious thought to the amount of IC resources likely to be available to support such strategies. FINDING: Emphasis on concepts such as "sensor-to-shooter" have promoted the dissemination of intelligence data and products to the lowest level of military operations, without full consideration of the effect on the "warfighter." IC Centers. The IC began using centers in 1986 as a means of addressing certain long-term issues on an IC-wide basis. At present there are seven such centers, covering the issues of arms control, non-proliferation, terrorism, counterintelligence, counternarcotics and organized crime, and overseas security. IC21 examined the concept of centers with a view towards determining whether they represented a better way to organize IC efforts, or if they were merely an organizational fad. Moreover, if they were a better concept, what implication did this have for the more traditional offices in CIA and the other major intelligence agencies? We concluded that this concept was successful in addressing specific, enduring issues and serving as IC focal points for these issues. Indeed, it would appear that centers will be even more important in an IC that puts greater emphasis on corporate management concepts. FINDING: Centers are successful in addressing critical, enduring intelligence issues on an IC-wide basis and should continue to be used as necessary. FINDING: There are several types of centers; they do not all perform the same functions. FINDING: IC-wide representation within Centers is insufficient and must be increased. RECOMMENDATION: Centers should be subject to a mandatory five year "sunset" review process under the DCI's direction. RECOMMENDATION: The Directors of the Nonproliferation, Crime and Narcotics, Counterterrorist, National Counterintelligence and Arms Control Intelligence Staff (renamed the Arms Control Intelligence Center) should also serve as IC issue managers. RECOMMENDATION: Although the center directors will serve as issue managers within the CIA, the centers should be located and managed within the IC based upon their unique attributes and principal roles: The National Counterintelligence Center functions principally as a policy and coordination body and should continue to come under the NSC. The Arms Control Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Crime and Narcotics Centers should come under the CIA. The Counterterrorism Center and the Counterintelligence (renamed the Foreign Counterintelligence) Center should come under the CS. The Center for Security Evaluation should come under the ISO. RECOMMENDATION: To facilitate IC participation in centers, the IC should develop a consistent policy regarding reimbursable billets and reimbursement of travel expenses. An appropriate amount of money should be designated in the authorization specifically to fund these center expenses. RECOMMENDATION: The IC personnel evaluation and promotion systems must accurately reflect and reward the performance of employees detailed to centers. Intelligence and Law Enforcement. One of the hallmarks of those transnational issues that have moved to the top of the IC agenda in the post-Cold War world is that they tend to straddle intelligence and law enforcement concerns. Concerns about safeguarding fundamental civil liberties have dictated a strict division between these two spheres. For example, the National Security Act mandates that the CIA will have no "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions." Issues such as narcotics, crime, terrorism and proliferation make the maintenance of this division more difficult. Having said that, it would appear that current provisions in law and in executive orders are sufficient to maintain the necessary difference without impeding the kind of cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement that most believe is necessary. FINDING: The National Security Act and existing Executive Orders are sufficiently flexible to allow improved cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence without blurring the important distinctions between the missions and authorities of the two communities. FINDING: Increased joint training is essential to closer cooperation and coordination between the two communities. RECOMMENDATION: Congress should consider statutory or other language that will set forth "reasonable" expectations of IC reporting on criminal activities. RECOMMENDATION: Within law enforcement agencies, information management and policies must be improved to facilitate sharing appropriate information with the IC that has been collected during the course of law enforcement investigations. RECOMMENDATION: Each law enforcement agency should be responsible for its own coordination with the CS. IC Communications. The relationship between communications and intelligence has been a difficult one for the U.S. government. The two functions have a certain degree of inter-relationship based on the need to be able to pass intelligence from collectors to analysts and from analysts to policy consumers on a timely basis. Some have even suggested that this is the critical problem in disseminating intelligence. It is important to distinguish between the two related but different parts of this issue. The IC is responsible for dissemination, the actual movement of intelligence products to their intended audience among policy makers. However, the technical or physical means by which this dissemination occurs are not and should not be responsibilities of the IC. FINDING: Communications is often cited as the most critical problem in disseminating information to users in a timely fashion. Timely delivery of intelligence products to consumers in the proper form is generally an intelligence weakness. FINDING: The IC is responsible to its consumers for timely dissemination of its products in the required forms and format. The development, procurement, management and maintenance of communications needed to disseminate these products are not, and should not be core competencies for the IC. "Communications" is defined narrowly as the conduit(s) for moving data from one point to another. This includes the standards necessary to interface hardware and software at either end of the communications conduit. FINDING: The communications community is best suited for providing specific standards and interface protocols to communications users to ensure interoperability. It is also best suited to provide the majority of U.S. government communications paths. FINDING: Managing Command, Control and Communications (C3) with intelligence in Defense, amalgamates these two activities, to the general disadvantage of intelligence, which tends to get shorter shrift and is overwhelmed by the much larger communications presence. RECOMMENDATION: The IC should not have communications as a core competency. It should be a communications user, with specifically identified requirements, and should not directly contract for communications "bandwidth." RECOMMENDATION: The IC must complete a thorough study of total IC communications needs and provide the results to the communications community. Such a study must be continuously reviewed and updated as new requirements emerge and as new capabilities and technologies are brought into service. RECOMMENDATION: The IC should maintain a consolidated core of communications professionals whose primary tasks will be to act as the "technological knowledge bridge" between the providers and the IC, to define communications standards for the IC and to review current capabilities and develop migration plans to meet developed architectures and standards. RECOMMENDATION: The IC should be fully compliant with the standards of emerging U.S. communications systems whenever and wherever possible, to ensure required data movement. RECOMMENDATION: The IC should invest to ensure that its system for collection, processing and analysis can access a communications point for dissemination. RECOMMENDATION: The IC must also invest to ensure the capability to service unique communications requirements that cannot be satisfied by the communications community. An example of this would be support for clandestine communications. RECOMMENDATION: The communications infrastructure supporting intelligence dissemination must move to support a "virtual worldwide architecture." RECOMMENDATION: The IC must do a better job of putting intelligence into a form that is usable with the users' systems. RECOMMENDATION: The Secretary of Defense should exercise his authority to create a separate Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Figure 3: IC21 Objective Community Figure 4: IC Functions Figure 5: IC Structure and Flow
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